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LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UTILIZATION
REVIEW IN ERISA HEALTH PLANS
JEFFREY E. SHUREN*
Rising costs in the U.S. health care system have led to the creation
of various cost-saving measures, including utilization review, that
have impacted the roles of both health plan providers and
administrators. Traditionally, health care professionals made
medical decisions whereas health plan administrators made
coverage decisions. Under prospective utilization review, one
form of utilization review, however, medical care and benefit
determinations overlap. Currently, plan participants injured as a
result of a negligent utilization review decision may not receive
adequate redress if the plan to which they belong is subject to the
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). Enacted in 1974, the statute includes a preemption
provision barring most state law-based causes of action.
Combined with the limited remedies available to participants for
harms imposed by their plans, the act has shielded entities
performing utilization review ("UROs") from liability. This
Article addresses those incongruities in ERISA and recommends
that any reform efforts should be directed to the realization of the
goal of U.S health care policy to provide quality, economically
efficient health care. This Article proposes that ERISA be
amended to hold UROs to the medical standard of care but with
the ability to defend their actions if they demonstrate by
reasonable scientific evidence that their decisions and guidelines
furnish plan participants with a level of care of comparable
efficacy and safety to the medical standard of care. As a result,
participants would receive quality health care while holding
UROs to a standard that permits them to implement more cost-
effective health care without necessarily incurring liability for
unsuccessful treatment outcomes.
* Medical Officer, Office of Policy, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Rockville,
Maryland. B.S., Northwestern University, 1985; M.D., Northwestern University, 1987;
J.D., University of Michigan, 1998.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the opinion of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
732 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 732
II. HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
COST-CONTAINMENT MEASURES ............................................. 735
III. PHYSICIAN AND URO ROLES UNDER THE CURRENT
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM .............................................................. 743
A . D escriptive Roles ................................................................... 743
B. Liability Issues Under the Current System ......................... 748
IV . E R ISA ........................................................................................... 752
A . Preem ption ............................................................................. 754
B. Fiduciary D uty ...................................................................... 758
C. Liability for Utilization Review Decisions Under State
L aw ......................................................................................... 763
D. Liability for Utilization Review Decisions Under
E R ISA .................................................................................... 768
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF ERISA ................................... 772
A . Fiduciary D uty ...................................................................... 772
B . Preem ption ............................................................................. 773
C. Recommendations ................................................................. 776
1. Legislative Proposal ........................................................ 777
2. R ationale .......................................................................... 779
V I. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 781
I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of
19741 created a set of requirements with which employers must
comply if offering certain benefits to their employees. 2 ERISA's
statutory scheme distinguishes "employee welfare benefit plans"
from "employee pension benefit plans"3 and imposes different sets of
1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
2. See id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(3)(1994). An employee welfare benefit plan is defined by
ERISA as any plan, fund, or program established or maintained by an employer or an
employee organization for the purpose of providing "medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services" to its participants or their beneficiaries. Id.
§ 1002(1). An employee pension benefit plan is similar to a welfare plan except that the
pension plan, fund, or program "provides retirement income to employees, or results in a
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment or beyond." Id. § 1002(2)(A) (1994). ERISA defines an "employee benefit
plan" as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan
which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."
Id. § 1002(3) (1994).
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requirements on each type of plan. In an effort to encourage the
growth of employer-sponsored benefit plans through the
establishment of uniform standards, Congress preempted the field of
ERISA plan regulation.4 As a result, the actions taken by an
employee benefit plan or those who administer the plan may be
protected under ERISA preemption from state law-imposed liability.
Moreover, ERISA limits available remedies and precludes the award
of compensatory and punitive damages.'
The U.S. system of health care delivery and financing has
evolved since the enactment of ERISA. In an effort to stem the
continuous rise of health care expenditures, third-party payers have
sought to impose restrictions on medical decision-making through a
variety of techniques, including utilization review.' The effect of one
type of utilization review, prospective utilization review,7 is to
determine what treatment a patient should receive. Because most
patients are unable to pay for treatment in the absence of
reimbursement from their insurer, a utilization review decision that
treatment is not appropriate and, therefore, will not be reimbursed,
is, in effect, a decision not to treat. The result is undertreatment.
Although several circuits no longer raise ERISA preemption as a bar
to medical malpractice claims against physicians offering services to
plan participants, decisions by plan administrators still receive wide
protection against state law causes of action.9 Moreover, as third-
party payers continue to merge financing and delivery of care while
requiring providers to consider costs when making medical decisions,
the differing treatment of claims against plan providers, such as
physicians, and those against plan administrators, which may include
UROs 10 appears artificial and contrary to the stated goals of
ERISA.1 Plan participants injured as a result of a negligent
utilization review decision, therefore, do not obtain adequate redress
because courts have interpreted ERISA preemption to apply to
4. See id. § 1144(a) (1994); infra Part V.A.
5. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248,260-61 (1993).
6. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
7. The other types of utilization review are retrospective and concurrent review.
See infra text accompanying note 58 (defining the three types of utilization review).
8. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 244 (listing federal cases addressing the issue of preemption of
state law claims by ERISA).
10. See infra notes 56-58,233-46 and accompanying text. A plan administrator is "the
person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is
operated." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (1994).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); see infra notes 116 and 119 and accompanying text.
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utilization review decisions.
This Article describes the limitations of ERISA preemption as
exemplified by the judiciary's treatment of claims against UROs.
Although several articles have addressed this issue in detail, these
works focused on either the legal theories under which claims against
UROs could avoid ERISA preemption 12 or the policy reasons behind
why preemption of utilization review claims runs counter to the goals
of ERISA.13 The critical issue, however, is not how Congress or the
judiciary can modify ERISA to bring claims in line with the Act's
goals and with the goals of our tort system. Rather, the important
questions are, how should Congress and the judiciary conceptualize
the roles of UROs, physicians, and other health care players in light
of current health care policy objectives and what liabilities should we
impose to alter the behavior of these players to develop the kind of
health care system we desire? Only then can we address the
narrower issue of how ERISA should be modified to advance its
goals while fostering our vision of the health care system.
Part II of this Article summarizes the evolution of U.S. health
care insurance and the implementation of cost-containment
measures. Part III analyzes the changing roles of UROs and
physicians, and explores how liability should be assigned to effectuate
the goals of the health care system. Part IV reviews ERISA's
preemption provisions, fiduciary duty requirements, and the legal
liability of UROs under both state law and ERISA. Finally, Part V
addresses the need for congressional modification of ERISA to
accord with ERISA's goals and the goals of health care policy.
12. See, e.g., Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging
Liability Claims Arising from Utilization Management and Financial Incentive
Arrangements Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J.
155, 216-17 (1997); 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047, 1061-62
(1995) (concluding that a broad preemption of state laws that relate to ERISA plans is
consistent with Congress's intent); Mary R. Kohler, Note, When the Whole Exceeds the
Sum of Its Parts: Why Existing Utilization Management Practices Don't Measure Up, 53
U. PiTT. L. REV. 1061, 1097-98 (1992); Peter H. Mihaly, Note, Health Care Utilization
Review: Potential Exposures to Negligence Liability, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1289, 1305-06
(1991).
13. See, e.g., David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability
for Medical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861, 919-20 (1991); H.R. Scheel, Recent
Development, Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.: ERISA Preemption of a Louisiana
Tort Action, 67 TUL. L. REV. 821, 837, 840 (1993); Diana Slivinska, Note, Health Care
Cost-Containment and Small Business: The Self-Insurance Option, 12 J.L. & COM. 333,
352-53 (1993).
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II. HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COST-
CONTAINMENT MEASURES
Until the 1920s, patients paid their physicians directly for
services rendered.14 Physicians absorbed the costs of health care
administered to the poor, or local communities reimbursed
physicians for such services.' 5 The rising costs of health care,
however, forced providers to seek alternative methods of payment. 6
Yet, the introduction of insurance, which had been successful in the
early twentieth century in the area of "industrial" life insurance, 7
proved to be problematic when applied to health care. General
principles of insurance require that the insured event (1) can be
clearly described; (2) is not something over which the insured has
control; and (3) has a low, but predictable, occurrence.' 8 In the case
of health care, however, the use of physician services remained in the
control of the patient, who elected to seek aid, and the physician, who
selected which tests to perform and which treatment to prescribe.
Thus, prior to the Great Depression, health insurance was not
commonplace because it was understood that offering such insurance
would result in adverse selection while encouraging greater use of
health services.' 9 When the stock market crashed in 1929, however,
the resultant drop in hospital occupancy, combined with the
increasing costs of health care, encouraged the American Hospital
Association and its members to establish service-benefit plans for
hospital care." Under a service-benefit plan, the subscriber receives
care from the hospital which then collects reimbursement from a
third-party payer.2' This action resulted in the creation of the non-
profit Blue Cross plans.' Subsequently, private insurance companies
14. See Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and
Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J.L. & IVIED. 7, 15 (1996).
15. See id. at 16.
16. See id.
17. The success of companies like Metropolitan Life and Prudential in selling life
insurance policies to working-class families was driven by the fear of a pauper burial. See
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 242-43 (1982).
18. See Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 16.
19. Adverse selection is the purchase of insurance by those most likely to become ill.
See STARR, supra note 17, at 294. The insurance companies, at the time, were treating
group health insurance as "experimental" because they were concerned about
"malingering"-that is feigning sickness (for whatever reason) because the health care
would be paid for by the insurance company and not the patient. See id.
20. See id. at 295-96. In 1931, only 62% of hospital beds were filled. See id.
Moreover, in the year following the crash, average hospital receipts dropped from about
$236 to $59 per patient. See id. at 295.
21. See id. at 292.
22. See id. at 294.
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entered the market.'
At first, health insurance only covered hospitalization. The
American Medical Association ("AMA") adamantly opposed
employing insurance coverage for medical services.24 Under pressure
from local medical societies, however, the AMA loosened its stance.2
Soon thereafter, the medical societies of California and Michigan
established prepayment plans, the predecessors of Blue Shield, to
allow guaranteed payments of medical services.26 Blue Shield arose
as provider-controlled plans that combined service and indemnity
benefits.27  Commercial insurers, on the other hand, offered
indemnity plans, under which a subscriber is directly reimbursed for
the portion of medical costs covered by the policy. Because the third-
party payer in an indemnity plan conducts all financial transactions
with the subscriber, indemnity benefits create the least involvement
between payers and providers.'m
Health insurance enrollment grew during World War II, due
largely to the labor movement. In 1942, the War Labor Board ruled
that fringe benefits, such as health insurance, equal to or below five
percent of wages were not considered inflationary.29 In response,
employers offered health benefits to compensate for the New Deal's
shortcomings and to attract workers.30  Health insurance plans had
23. See Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 16.
24. See STARR, supra note 17, at 299. The AMA feared that physicians would lose
control over medical decisionmaking and patients would lose their freedom of choice if
medical services were furnished on a prepaid basis. See id. at 299-306.
25. See id. at 306.
26. See id. at 306-07. Soon after, similar plans arose in New York, Pennsylvania, and
other states. See id. Blue Shield grew slowly. By 1945, Blue Shield had two million
subscribers nationally as compared to 19 million people enrolled in Blue Cross. See id. at
308.
27. See id. at 294. Blue Cross was created to cover hospital costs. Initially it
resembled a prepayment plan. See STARR, supra note 17, at 308. Blue Cross has evolved
over the years moving more towards indemnity plans and today may offer such options as
preferred provider organizations. Blue Shield was established to cover physician services.
It initially combined elements of both service-benefit and indemnity plans whereas most
commercial insurers used just indemnity plans.
28. See Griner, supra note 13, at 871. A third type of health insurance plan is the
direct-service plan. Under this scheme, the third-party payer provides a specified range
of services on a prepaid basis. The direct-service plan imposes the most limitations on
providers as compared to service-benefit and indemnity plans. See id. at 873.
29. See STARR, supra note 17, at 311. Therefore, employers could offer health
benefits up to five percent of wages in value without producing an adverse inflationary
effect on the cost of employment, thereby making the provision of health benefits an
attractive means for employers to obtain workers.
30. See id. The New Deal did not adequately address the workforce shortages
created by the war. Therefore, employers used benefits as one means to obtain workers.
736 [Vol. 77
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already received a boost when labor unions acquired the right to
bargain collectively for health benefits through the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act31 (known as the Wagner Act) in 1935.
Although all types of plans witnessed increased enrollment,
commercial insurers received the largest gains. In 1949, commercial
insurers covered 28 million people, whereas Blue Cross covered 31
million enrollees.32 By 1953, commercial insurers furnished health
insurance to 29 percent of the population and Blue Cross to 27
percent.3 As a result of the advantages offered by commercial
insurers' indemnity plans, low-risk workers enrolled with commercial
insurers.34 In response, Blue Cross and Blue Shield adopted plans
similar to indemnity insurance.35 With the rise in indemnity plan
enrollment, the gap between the insured and the uninsured widened
as low-income families and the chronically ill found it increasingly
difficult to obtain health insurance.36
Congress responded to the limited health insurance coverage for
the elderly and poor with the creation of Medicare37 and Medicaid 38
31. See Wagner Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
32. See STARR, supra note 17, at 327.
33. See id. at 328.
34. See id. at 330. In the late 1940s, the provision of employee benefits increased as
labor unions wielded their new collective bargaining powers. The Blues (Blue Cross and
Blue Shield) were at a significant disadvantage as compared to commercial insurers. The
commercial insurers offered the convenience of receiving a variety of insurances, such as
life insurance, through a single entity. See id. at 329. The Blues' enabling laws, on the
other hand, restricted the Blues to providing only health coverage. See id. Local control
of different Blues plans also precluded their ability to supply national coverage. See id.
Furthermore, indemnity plans offered greater flexibility in health benefits, gave
employers the opportunity to play a direct administrative role, and, most significantly,
offered coverage of healthy, low-risk workers at a lower price through the use of
"experience ratings." Id. Under an experience rating, the commercial insurers charged
each employee group based on the costs that group "experienced." Id. In contrast, Blue
Cross used a community rating system wherein each group paid the same rate regardless
of their level of risk demands. See id. By redistributing costs from high- to low-risk
groups, the Blues disenfranchised low-risk groups. See id.
35. The Blues abandoned community rating and adopted an experience rating
system. See id. at 332. According to Professor Starr, Blue Shield became more like
indemnity insurance because physicians disfavored service benefits. See STARR, supra
note 17, at 308.
36. See id. at 333-34. Under an indemnity plan, the plan reimburses only for covered
services; the amount covered depends on the amount of the premiums paid. As the more
well-to-do purchased indemnity insurance, premiums went up making health insurance
less affordable. This is one of the reasons why Congress enacted the Medicare and
Medicaid statutes.
37. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97,79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg (1994)). Congress enacted Medicare to furnish
medical care coverage for the elderly.
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in 1965. Medicare and Medicaid initially furnished repayment to
physicians on a charge basis, under which physicians received
reimbursement based on the reasonable costs of treatment.39
Commercial insurers reimbursed health services on a fee-for-service
basis. Neither system gave physicians or patients an incentive to
economize the care rendered. Instead, the economic incentives of
both systems encouraged the overuse of services. Health care costs
skyrocketed, due in large part to the reimbursement system of the
fee-for-service regime, the practice of defensive medicine by
physicians to avoid lawsuits, and the use of emerging technologies by
the medical community.40 By the late 1960s, Medicare hospital
expenditures had increased by 18.1% annually.41 In the 1980s, the
annual cost of health care more than doubled." According to the
Bureau of the Census, Americans spent $249.1 billion on health care
in 1980, rising to $604.1 billion, or 11.6% of the Gross National
Product ("GNP"), in 1989.43 By 1993, the U.S. spent 14% of its GNP
on health care, totaling $942.5 billion.' In response to the cost of
health care's increasing financial burden on the U.S. economy and on
individuals and groups seeking health insurance, the public and
private sectors initiated several cost control measures.
Medicare's Diagnosis-Related Group ("DRG") reimbursement
38. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97,79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994)). Medicaid, a cooperative state-federal
program, furnishes health insurance to income-eligible individuals and families.
39. See Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners, Health Care Delivery
and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 399, 404 (1996).
40. See id. at 401-02. Defensive medicine may cost the United States $15 billion each
year. See Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost
Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297,
1298 (1994). Widespread use of unnecessary tests may increase health costs as well. See
Marcia Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician, 254 JAMA 1203, 1205 (1985). For
an argument that physicians' personal malpractice experience does not prompt them to
engage in defensive medicine, see Peter A. Glassman et al., Physicians' Personal
Malpractice Experiences Are Not Related to Defensive Clinical Practices, 21 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 219, 233-34 (1996). This article also contends that defensive medical
practices may not be as common as previously thought. Id.
41. See Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 18.
42. See Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment
of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 724 (1994).
43. See id. at 724 n.11.
44. See Pedroza, supra note 39, at 400. The United States spends nearly twice as
much of its GNP on health care as does the United Kingdom, although morbidity and
mortality remain roughly the same for the two countries. See Frances H. Miller, Denial of
Health Care and Informed Consent in English and American Law, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 37,
42 (1992). For an alternative view that rising health care costs derive principally from
inflation, see Griner, supra note 13, at 909-10.
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system represents one of the early efforts to contain medical costs.45
Introduced in 1983, the DRG system pays a predetermined amount
to the physician or hospital independent of the care provided.46
Hospitals and physicians can generate profits only by supplying care
below the DRG amount. The inherent risk is to underconsume
resources and undertreat patients, in contrast to the fee-for-service
incentive to overconsume and overtreat. Although the federal
government made early attempts at cost-containment, the principal
efforts to control health care costs came on the part of employers.47
The trend in health insurance coverage since 1980 has been to
decrease the number of individuals covered by an insurance policy
(known as "covered lives"), limit benefits, and constrict the scope of
coverage. In an attempt to control their exposure to rising health
care costs and maintain or increase health benefits for their
employees, employers pressured the insurance industry to design
more cost-effective health plans. Several large corporations invited
insurers and health plans to compete for the opportunity to provide
coverage to their employees.49  By establishing a demand for
affordable, comprehensive health coverage, these corporate giants
encouraged the growth of managed care and managed competition.50
Managed care is a system that integrates the financing and delivery of
health care within a single entity." Managed competition, on the
other hand, is the use of market forces to shape the delivery and
financing of health care into a cost- and resource-efficient system.5a
Managed competition encourages the alignment of employers, health
plans, and individuals into purchasing groups that can negotiate
prices with payers. 3
Managed care plans seek to "manage" costs by shifting the risk
of excess cost and utilization to those providers directly responsible
45. See Pedroza, supra note 39, at 406.
46. See id.
47. See Eleanor D. Kinney, On Physician Decision-Making and Managed Care:
Resolving Consumer Grievances in a Managed Care Environment, 6 HEALTH MATRIX
147, 150 (1996).
48. See id. at 147.
49. See, e.g., GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: H]MOS AND THE
BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST 16-18 (1996) (describing Allied Signal Corporation's
efforts to control the cost of employee health benefits).
50. See id. at 18.
51. See John D. Wilkerson et al., The Emerging Competitive Managed Care
Marketplace, in COMPETITIVE MANAGED CARE: THE EMERGING HEALTH CARE
SYsTEM 3,3 (John D. Wilkerson et al. eds., 1997).
52. See Battaglia, supra note 12, at 156.
53. See id.
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for supplying care to plan members, thereby furnishing providers
with an incentive to limit unwarranted medical services. 4 The
control of utilization is the key concept behind managed care. These
entities employ various cost control measures, many falling under the
rubric of utilization management.5 5 One approach used by utilization
management is utilization review, the process whereby patients'
needs are evaluated in light of objective criteria to determine
whether to pay for an individual's medical care. Payment is denied
by a utilization reviewer if the care provided or to be provided is not
necessary.56 Thus, physician compliance is induced through financial
"risk shifting." 57 Utilization review is further differentiated into three
54. See Kinney, supra note 47, at 148. As much as one-third of total health care
spending is unnecessary. See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the
Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV.
355,362 n.28 (1994).
55. Utilization management entails three principal elements: benefit design, quality
control, and health services delivery. See Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in
Health Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal
Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1674, 1679 (1994). By designing a benefits package that
covers only medically necessary care, monitoring the plan's resources and providers, and
assessing physicians' performance through a quality assurance program, Utilization
management controls costs prospectively. See id. Utilization management may employ
one or more approaches. Three approaches-second-opinion programs, discharge
planning, and case management-utilize specialized personnel. See BRADFORD H.
GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITY
OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 275 (1991). Second-opinion programs require patients to
obtain an opinion from a second physician before undergoing procedures considered to be
subject to unnecessary use. See id. at 276. Discharge planning refers to the arrangement
for post-hospitalization services for a patient prior to their discharge from the hospital,
typically performed to decrease the length of hospital of stays. See id. at 278-79. Case
management entails the use of an external case manager who reviews individual cases and
develops alternative patient care plans. See John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability
in Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 191, 193
(1989). Typically, case management is used in the ambulatory setting. See id.
56. See Cheralyn E. Schessler, Comment, Liability Implications of Utilization Review
as a Cost Containment Mechanism, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (1992).
57. Third-party payers induce financial risk shifting through an assortment of
arrangements, such as ownership interest, joint venture, bonus arrangements, rewards,
penalties, or a combination thereof. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization
Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost
Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 30 (1993). Common methods used
by payers to shift risk to providers include capitation (predetermined fee per enrollee),
withholding (payer keeps a portion of the reimbursement to use for reward or
punishment), discounted fee-for-service (provider gives discount to payer), per diem
payments (set fee per day per patient), and profit sharing. See id. at 30-31. Not all risk
shifting methods produce the same effect. Capitation forces the provider to shoulder
personal loss. As a result, capitation produces the greatest risk of undertreatment
because the provider receives no reimbursement for providing additional services but is
responsible for covering costs in excess of the capitation fee. See id. at 31-32.
The underlying rationale of these cost-containment efforts is to furnish providers
ERISA UTILIZATION REVIEW
types of review: (1) retrospective review, under which the
determination for payment is made after services are rendered; (2)
concurrent review, in which a decision regarding payment is made
while treatment is ongoing, and length of stay and resource
consumption are monitored if the reviewer deems inpatient care
necessary; and (3) prospective (or pre-admission) review, under
which a payment determination is made prior to the institution of
care.
5 8
Utilization review arose out of the movement to standardize
medical practice and improve quality.59 In the early 1960s, Blue
Cross formed utilization review committees to review the necessity of
an individual patient's hospital admission and length of stay. Under
Medicare, hospitals receiving Medicare payments were required to
form review panels to oversee the appropriateness and quality of
care.61  Under the 1972 amendments to the Medicare Act, the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of
Health and Human Services) established separate professional
standards review organizations ("PSROs") to monitor
appropriateness of care.62 In addition, the amendments empowered
Medicare and Medicaid to deny payment for services unnecessary for
efficient care.63  These early PSROs proved inefficient and
unmanageable; therefore, in 1982 Congress replaced the PSROs with
Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review
Organizations ("PROs"). 4 The PROs differed from PSROs in that
private entities performed utilization review for government-
sponsored health programs.6 5 Moreover, the PROs possessed the
authority to deny claims and impose sanctions for care deemed
unnecessary, inappropriate, or of inadequate quality.66
with economic incentives to act as gatekeepers for the third-party payer. See id. at 18.
Consequently, providers will offer services to patients in accordance with payer
guidelines, or else risk incurring financial losses. See id.
58. See Battaglia, supra note 12, at 171-72.
59. See Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 18.
60. See id.
61. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(k), 79 Stat.
286, 318-19 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1994); Battaglia, supra
note 12, at 168.
62. See Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat.
1329, 1429-1445 (1972) (repealed 1982); Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 18-19.
63. See Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 223, 86 Stat. 1329,
1393 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1994)); see id.
64. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 143,
96 Stat. 324, 382 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 (1994)).
65. See Battaglia, supra note 12, at 169-70.
66. See Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 19.
1999]
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The potential benefits of PROs also affected the private sector.
Between 1982 and 1985, twenty-seven percent of U.S. companies
introduced utilization review into their health plans.67 By the end of
the 1980s, fifty percent of large employers used utilization review
programs. 8 During that same period, the American Hospital
Association determined that hospitals may have had to interact with
approximately 50 to 250 different utilization review entities.6 9 In
1996, approximately ninety percent of employers used some type of
utilization review in their health plans.7° Today, utilization review is
conducted by managed care organizations, insurance companies,
third-party administrators, private companies, and federal and state
governments. 71
Although each of the three types of utilization review is still used
in the current market, prospective review offers the greatest
opportunity to control costs.7' Because of its singular importance, for
the remainder of this Article, "utilization review" is used
interchangeably with prospective utilization review. Although
prospective review more effectively restrains costs, it, as a result of
this cost control, increases the potential for malpractice liability when
67. See Battaglia, supra note 12, at 170.
68. See Kohler, supra note 12, at 1063 n.8.
69. See Kilcullen, supra note 14, at 23.
70. See Battaglia, supra note 12, at 170.
71. See id. at 170-71.
72. See id. at 171-72. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992):
By its very nature, a system of prospective decisionmaking influences the
beneficiary's choice among treatment options to a far greater degree than does
the theoretical risk of disallowance of a claim facing a beneficiary in a
retrospective system. Indeed, the perception among insurers that prospective
determinations result in lower health care costs is premised on the likelihood
that a beneficiary, faced with the knowledge of what the plan will and will not
pay for, will choose the treatment option recommended by the plan in order to
avoid risking total or partial disallowance of benefits.
Id. at 1332. Thus, the court concluded that "[a] beneficiary in [a prospective reviewi
system would likely be far less inclined to undertake the course of treatment that the
insurer has at least preliminarily rejected." Id.
Proponents of prospective utilization review argue that use of the method results in
significant savings-as much as an eight-to-one savings-to-cost ratio, according to one
study. See Griner, supra note 13, at 910; see also Paul J. Feldstein et al., Private Cost
Containment: The Effects of Utilization Review Programs on Health Care Use and
Expenditures, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1310, 1313-14 (1988) (concluding that utilization
review produces a one-time reduction in hospital use and medical expenditures). But see
Stephen N. Rosenberg et al., Effect of Utilization Review in a Fee-For-Service Health
Insurance Plan, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1326, 1328-29 (1995) (finding no difference in
rates of hospital admission, average lengths of hospital stay, and percentage of patients
who received preadmission testing between actual utilization reviews and sham reviews).
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attempts to reduce utilization and constrain costs conflict with the
ability to provide adequate health care consistent with established
medical standards. As a method of health care rationing, prospective
utilization review risks sacrificing quality of care for lower costs.
When utilization control efforts result in the provision of inadequate
care, the central issue in apportioning liability is determining who
owes what duty to whom. The next Part explores this topic.
III. PHYSICIAN AND URO ROLES UNDER THE CURRENT HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM
The roles of physicians and utilization review organizations
("UROs") continue to evolve as the health care landscape changes.
The following sections describe the functions of physicians and
UROs and discuss liability concerns raised by the changing health
care market.
A. Descriptive Roles
Under the traditional fee-for-service system, physicians,
unhindered by outside influence, possessed the authority to
determine what constituted good care. With full reimbursement for
services rendered, physicians could decide their patients' needs
without considering the costs of these services.73 Moreover, physician
and patient interests converged when abundant funding of health
care was available.74 From an ethical perspective, the medical
profession has placed the responsibility for patient care squarely on
the shoulders of physicians since the time of Hippocrates.' In
accordance, malpractice law traditionally governed physicians and
physicians alone. From a legal perspective, physicians were and still
are held to a customary standard of care that requires the physician
to have and to use "the same degree of skill, knowledge, and care
that is ordinarily possessed... by members of the medical profession
under similar circumstances. '76 Physicians who fail to comport with
the standard of care risk incurring tort damages. In addition, the
73. See E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM.
J.L. & MED. 79, 81 (1994).
74. See id. at 82-83; see also supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (describing the
increased reimbursements for medical care during the late 1960s to the early 1990s).
75. See Morreim, supra note 73, at 81; see also Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the
Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health
Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241 (1995) (discussing the misapplication of a fiduciary
role to physicians).
76. MILES J. ZAREMSKI & Louis S. GOLDSTEIN, 1 MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL
NEGLIGENCE § 6:11, at 23 (1988).
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prevalence of new technologies covered by insurance plans and the
fear of liability for adverse outcomes resulting from the failure to use
these innovations encouraged physicians to inject emerging
technologies into the standard of care, driving up the cost of
providing adequate patient care.77  Quality came to mean
administering every intervention of potential benefit.7  Therefore,
the ethics, law, and economics of medicine imbued physicians with
the authority to define quality of care and required them to provide
costly treatments to their patients.79
With the advent of managed care and the institution of financial
risk shifting and prospective utilization review, conflicts of interest
arose between physicians and patients. Under a standard indemnity
plan, the payer contracts with the patient and the patient contracts
with the physician, whereas under managed care, the payer has an
independent contractual relationship with the physician that may
specify utilization controls and financial incentives. A physician
under a contract with a managed care organization ("MCO") must,
therefore, weigh several factors. Physicians still retain their ethical
obligation to provide quality medical care; failure to provide such
care may incur malpractice liability. On the other hand, physicians
risk losing a bonus, receiving a monetary penalty, or being dropped
from the plan if spending exceeds predetermined targets.80
Under utilization review, third-party payers require that the
physician or the enrollee obtain its permission before instituting an
expensive treatment or arranging for hospitalization.81 Utilization
reviewers examine medical decisions that were once the sole domain
of physicians and patients.' Consequently, through utilization review
and financial incentives, third-party payers threaten the core of our
77. See Morreim, supra note 73, at 83.
78. American culture favors the rescue of "the doomed." See Kent G. Rutter,
Democratizing HMO Regulation to Enforce the "Rule of Rescue," 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
147, 160 (1996). In medicine, this "rule of rescue" is evidenced by elaborate critical care
units and transplant teams. As a result of the rule of rescue, Americans expect expensive
interventions for the critically ill-those least likely to benefit from treatment. See id. at
160-61. This expectation raises the bar defining the standard of quality care. By
comparison, British patients, who have been subject to a capped budget for medical care
since the creation of the National Health System in 1948, generally cooperate in medical
rationing by requiring less from their physicians. See Miller, supra note 44, at 52.
79. See Morreim, supra note 73, at 84.
80. Sixty-eight percent of MCOs that employ their own physicians and 84% of other
MCOs use some form of physician financial incentive to decrease costs. See Rutter, supra
note 78, at 176.
81. See id. at 153.
82. See Scheel, supra note 13, at 824.
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health care system, the physician-patient relationship. This
relationship stems from trust. Patients expect their physicians to act
in the patients' best interests. Cost-containment efforts, however,
undermine this trust8 3 and alter a physician's ability to honor the
medical, ethical, and legal values of the medical profession and
American culture."4 Patient expectations remain unchanged, but
without the economic base required to support them.8
Furthermore, the advent of prospective utilization review and
other cost control measures create the possibility that patients may
be harmed in new ways, such as negligent decisions by UROs.86
These measures challenge us to ponder the social value of cost-
containment and to redefine who owes what duties to whom. It is
beyond the scope of this Article, however, to assess critically the
normative roles of each player in the health care system. Instead, this
Article makes some general observations on physician and employer
conduct while focusing primarily on the role of UROsY To ascertain
what duties should be imposed on UROs first requires an analysis of
the functions UROs perform within the health care system.
All prospective utilization review ("UR") programs share
certain common features.88 Virtually all use telephone rather than
face-to-face contact between a reviewer and a health care provider. 9
Patients typically retain the responsibility of initiating review,
although physicians often make the first call to avoid a denied claim.
Prospective UR programs then implement a two-stage assessment
83. See Randall, supra note 57, at 36-37.
84. See Morreim, supra note 73, at 85.
85. See id. at 85-86.
86. Of 2000 physicians surveyed, 83.6% of those physicians who are MCO members
and 92% of those who are not MCO members indicated that financial incentives diminish
the quality of care. See Laura H. Harshbarger, Note, ERISA Preemption Meets the Age of
Managed Care: Toward a Comprehensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 191, 221
(1996).
87. For an in-depth analysis of physician, payer, and patient duties, see Morreim,
supra note 73. Morreim suggests that patients, as the ultimate payers, should make the
actual cost-value tradeoff decisions after receiving adequate information about
treatments and their effectiveness and costs. See id. at 79. Consequently, Morreim
contends that the need for utilization review, will decrease as patients decide which
interventions are cost-justified. See id. at 102. In addition, better informed patients will
be more amenable to working with physicians as-partners in such economic matters. See
id.
88. See COMMITTEE ON UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES,
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE
ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 66 (1989) [hereinafter CONTROLLING COSTS].
89. See id. One exception is the use of on-site review nurses by UROs to review
continued stays. See id.
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process. In the first stage, a reviewer-usually a nurse9 -- obtains
information about the patient and the proposed services and applies
objective criteria, called utilization review guidelines9' in order to
determine whether the proposed services are "medically necessary"
or "medically appropriate."'  The reviewer further determines
whether the site for performing the services, the timing of the
services, and the length of any requested hospital stay are
appropriate as well.93
In the second stage, a reviewer makes a final determination
whether to approve or deny payment. If the reviewer ascertains that
the planned services falls within the guideline's criteria, some UROs
allow the nurse to make decisions to approve payment. Other UROs
require that a physician reviewer make the final determination.94 In
general, UROs require that a physician reviewer make the final
determination to deny payment.95 If services are denied, the nurse or
the physician may or may not directly contact the patient's treating
physician. If the second stage reviewer denies approval, URO
policies differ as whether to direct the first stage reviewer to
negotiate with the treating physician to achieve conformity in the
90. In some cases, the URO uses experienced medical secretaries rather than nurses.
See id. at 72.
91. Utilization review protocols may vary between UROs, but in general, each seeks
to combine quality control and cost containment to create guidelines for appropriate care
while eliminating overutilization. See Schessler, supra note 56, at 391. These guidelines
differ from clinical practice guidelines, which are developed by physicians to provide a
standard of care tailored to a specific disease or procedure. See id.
92. "Medically necessary" and "medically appropriate" refer to what is "necessary"
and "appropriate" under the particular UR guideline, not to what the medical community
considers necessary or appropriate care for that patient. Retrospective utilization review
typically makes "medical necessity" determinations as to whether a proposed treatment is
necessary for a medical reason but not whether the particular treatment is the most
appropriate. Prospective utilization review, on the other hand, usually determines
whether the proposed therapy is both necessary and appropriate.
93. See CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 88, at 66. Some nurse reviewers handle 40
to 50 calls and between 10 to 20 certifications each day. See id. at 72.
94. See id. at 66. UROs employ physician reviewers on a full-time or a part-time
basis. See id. at 74. However, some UROs do not use licensed physicians as reviewers.
Kohler, supra note 12, at 1078.
95. See CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 88, at 66. According to a 1989 study on
UROs by the Institute of Medicine, all organizations visited said their physician reviewers
were not bound to follow the organization's criteria. See id. at 74. It is questionable,
however, how much expertise these physician reviewers actually possess to make these
decisions. In addition, physician reviewers may be more lenient than the criteria they are
expected to implement. See Lawrence C. Kleinman et al., Adherence to Prescribed
Explicit Criteria During Utilization Review: An Analysis of Communications Between
Attending and Receiving Physicians, 278 JAMA 497, 500 (1997). This raises questions
about the efficacy of UR guidelines in containing costs.
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review standards.96 UROs also differ as to whether to instruct their
nurse reviewers to coach treating physicians on how to obtain
approval. 97 In addition, the amount of training received by both
nurse and physician reviewers varies as does the extent of reviewer
monitoring.9  UROs may themselves seek to comply with
accreditation standards developed by the Utilization Review
Accreditation Commission, along with the American Medical Peer
Review Association, Health Insurance Association of America, and
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association.99 In sum, under utilization
review, a URO reviews the treating physician's recommendations
and determines whether the proposed treatment is medically
necessary or medically appropriate for a particular patient.
Although third-party payers claim that their decisions are
benefits determinations and not medical decisions, the effect of their
decisions is to determine what treatment a patient should receive.
Because most patients cannot afford treatment without
reimbursement from the plan and most physicians cannot afford to
provide care without reimbursement,100 a determination that
treatment is not appropriate and, therefore, will not be paid for by
the plan, is in effect a decision not to provide care or to provide
alternative care. A UR decision is, therefore, akin to and frequently
has the effect of a medical decision by a treating physician.1°1 This
similarity is highlighted by the fact that UROs use health care
providers, such as physicians and nurses, to make UR determinations
and to design UR guidelines."° This scenario is clearly distinct from
a decision dealing solely with benefits determinations, such as when a
96. See CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 88, at 72.
97. See id.
98. Nurse reviewers receive anywhere from two to six weeks of formal training
whereas UROs provide physician reviewers with one day to several days of training. See
id. at 73, 77. Nurse supervisors oversee nurse reviewers, and medical directors oversee
physician reviewers. Each nurse supervisor may oversee from six to seventy-six nurses
and monitor by informal oversight, such as walking around and overhearing
conversations, or by more systematic monitoring, such as using a computer or listening in
on calls. Monitoring of physicians varies from employing an outside panel to review a
sample of the URO physicians' determinations to relying on the nurse reviewers to whom
the decisions are communicated. See id.
99. See Battaglia, supra note 12, at 173 (overviewing the standards employed).
100. See Scheel, supra note 13, at 824.
101. According to the Institute of Medicine, one of the UROs visited during the 1989
study said that under its state's law, decisions about whether services should be certified
as medically appropriate "could be construed to be the practice of medicine and thus
must be carried out by a physician who is licensed to practice in the state."
CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 88, at 73.
102. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
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plan administrator determines whether a particular treatment is
covered by the plan at all or whether a participant is eligible for a
particular benefit.
Not only are UROs interposing themselves into medical
decisionmaking by determining what is medically necessary, they are
also changing the physician standard of care by affecting physician
decisionmaking and, therefore, physician practice. UROs evaluate a
treating physician's plan of care using their own medical experts. 1°3
Moreover, they "recommend" alternative courses of treatment with
the knowledge that most patients will follow their directions. The
arrangements between third-party payers, UROs, and physicians,
therefore, distribute medical authority among several actors.
B. Liability Issues Under the Current System
The reality of utilization review in today's health care system
provides the strongest argument for imposing liability on those who
make negligent UR decisions. First, it is immaterial whether or not a
utilization review determination is characterized as a medical
decision if, as a result, the patient decides to forgo treatment. Many
patients must choose not to receive treatment if payment is denied
because they cannot afford to pay for the treatment themselves.
Second, it would be unfair to allow UROs and third-party payers to
influence or interfere with medical decisionmaking, and yet avoid
liability for their actions.
Under the currently evolving health care system, physicians are
caught between the demands of plan sponsors and administrators to
become cost conscious and their patients' needs for quality care.
Arguably, physicians can no longer avoid factoring economic
concerns into their treatment decisions.104  Cost-containment
measures will prove ineffective if physicians can insulate themselves
from economic considerations. Moreover, the reduction of Medicare
reimbursement for many services and the use of utilization review
techniques in the Medicare and Medicaid programs suggest that
103. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
104. See David M. Eddy, Broadening the Responsibilities of Practitioners: The Team
Approach, 269 JAMA 1849, 1852-53 (1993). Furthermore, the current system puts
physicians in conflict with URO reviewers. Physicians may try to "front load" their
claims to assure payment. See Kohler, supra note 12, at 1078-79. For example, if a
patient's insurance allows her a particular number of office visits, the physician may
design a treatment plan that includes a number of office visits just below the maximum to




Congress intends to encourage cost conscious medical practice.
However, physicians must continue to act in the best interests of their
patients to protect the physician-patient relationship and to ensure
the provision of quality care. Modifying the standard of care to
include cost considerations runs counter to physicians' self-imposed
ethical obligation to do everything possible for the patient and could
disproportionately affect the poor and elderly."' The infusion of cost
considerations into the equation of health care determinations raises
concerns regarding where liability for negligent decisions should fall.
Even in an environment of cost-containment, physicians still
retain control over their knowledge, skill, and judgment. The limited
resources available to physicians and the restrictions imposed on
medical decisionmaking by UROs and third-party payers do not
justify immunizing physicians from their decisions when they deviate
from standard medical practice. It would be unfair, however, to hold
physicians negligent when customary medical practice warrants
health care rationing by third parties." 6  Placing additional
responsibilities on physicians, such as requiring physicians to disclose
whether a potentially beneficial treatment is being denied for
financial reasons, could serve as a necessary prerequisite to limit
physician liability. 07 Furthermore, mandating physician disclosure
could improve physician-patient relations by casting physicians in the
role of ally rather than enemy.08 The next issue, therefore, is
whether Congress or the courts should formulate the duties of health
care players.
Leaving the judiciary with the task of determining what duties
apply to UROs and third-party payers places an inappropriate
burden on the courts to resolve the tension between the goal of
containing costs and the goal of the tort system to compensate
harmed individuals. Some commentators have argued that
employing tort liability to address the inequities of utilization review
would frustrate the purpose behind constraining health care
expenditures. 0 9 The critical issue behind liability in this context,
105. Some commentators argue, however, that professional ethics, prestige, and the
competition for patients will prevent physicians from depressing the standard of care too
much in response to cost-containment pressures. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice
Standard Under Health Care Cost Containment, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 347, 352
(1989).
106. See Miller, supra note 44, at 70.
107. See id. at 70-71.
108. See id. at 71.
109. See, e.g., Rex O'Neal, Note, Safe Harbor for Health Care Cost Containment, 43
STAN. L. REV. 399, 421 (1991). Other commentators prefer using contracts and contract
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however, is who should be responsible for making what decisions.
American jurisprudence provides that those who make a decision
should remain liable for the consequences of that decision. Joint
decisions require joint liability.
The potential categories of liability for UROs, physicians, and
payers under tort common law are: (1) coverage determination by
payer; (2) medical necessity or appropriateness decision by URO
(negligent UR decisionmaking or negligent design or implementation
of utilization review criteria, including delay in approving payment);
(3) negligent selection or supervision of physicians by payer,
including physician financial incentive programs; (4) negligent
selection or supervision of reviewers by URO; (5) negligent design or
implementation of the plan by the payer; (6) malpractice by
physician; and (7) vicarious liability by payer for physician
malpractice. 110 Categories 1, 3, and 4 involve nonmedical, cost-based
damages to ration health care. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial
Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1755 (1992). However, the imposition of a contract regime on patient care will
probably provide less compensation and, therefore, less deterrent effect, than a tort
regime.
110. The following hypothetical illustrates the various forms of potential liability: Dr.
Smith, a general practitioner, determines that his patient, Mr. Johnson, experiences chest
pains as the result of coronary artery atherosclerosis ("CAA"), for which he decides to
order a cardiac stress test but not to refer Mr. Johnson to a cardiologist. Mr. Johnson
receives health benefits from his employee benefit plan, which is offered by a health
maintenance organization ("HMO") that uses a URO. The HMO had established a
series of financial incentives to encourage physicians, like Dr. Smith, not to refer patients
to specialists. The HMO denies payment for the stress test because the procedure is not
covered by the plan and the URO denies payment for angioplasty (the use of a balloon on
the end of a tube inserted into the coronary arteries to remove any obstructions to blood
flow) because the procedure is not medically appropriate. Dr. Smith does not question
the URO's decision or inform his patient of the need to perform a cardiac stress test.
Instead, Dr. Smith prescribes medication to Mr. Johnson, reimbursement for which is
approved by the URO. After twelve months, Mr. Johnson switches his care to Dr.
Bennet, a cardiologist, because he has not noted any improvement on the medication. Dr.
Bennet finds on an EKG (a test measuring the heart rhythm) that Mr. Johnson suffered a
minor heart attack several months before. Dr. Bennet recommends that Mr. Johnson
undergo an angioplasty, but the URO denies payment because, in its judgment, the
procedure is not medically appropriate. Instead, the URO will approve a change in
medication. Dr. Bennet appeals the judgment. The HMO sends Mr. Johnson to another
physician for a second opinion. This physician agrees with Dr. Bennet. After three
months, the URO approves the angioplasty. Mr. Johnson's CAA has advanced rapidly,
however, precluding him as a candidate for angioplasty. As a result, Dr. Bennet, with the
URO's approval, arranges for Mr. Johnson to undergo coronary artery bypass surgery to
reopen his clogged arteries, a procedure that carries a greater risk of stroke (obstruction
of blood vessel to the brain leading to brain injury) than an angioplasty. The HMO will,
however, approve the surgery only if performed by Dr. Jenkins. During the surgery, Dr.
Jenkins nicks a large artery and Mr. Johnson's blood pressure falls precipitously in
response to the loss of blood; the drop in blood pressure places Mr. Johnson at risk for
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determinations. Categories 6 and 7 entail purely medical decisions.
However, category 5 and, in particular, category 2 involve both
medical and cost-based determinations. Category 2-UR
decisionmaking and design and implementation of utilization review
criteria-pertains to the current goal of health policy: efficient
utilization of our health care resources to provide quality health care.
Because there are many potential areas of liability and because some
of these areas involve both medical and cost-containment issues, the
duties of UROs, physicians, and payers in the UR decisionmaking
process and the design and implementation of utilization review
criteria should be established at the outset.111 Only after outlining
these duties can an analysis of what reform measures should be
undertaken proceed. The remainder of this Article will examine the
potential duties of UROs, physicians, and payers in utilization review
determinations and UR guideline design and implementation,
focusing primarily on how well ERISA addresses these concerns and
what changes to ERISA would best enhance the performance of
these duties."
brain injury from inadequate blood flow to the brain. When Mr. Johnson awakens from
the anesthesia, he cannot move the right side of his body. Dr. Bennet concludes that Mr.
Johnson suffered a stroke during the surgery.
The potential liability in this case can be broken down into the following categories:
(1) negligent determination of medical appropriateness (or necessity) by URO secondary
to negligent design or implementation of its guidelines (i.e., determinations that both
angioplasty and a cardiac stress test are not appropriate, as well as the delay in the
approval of angioplasty); (2) physician malpractice secondary to the HMO's independent
negligence in provider supervision due to its incentive program (i.e., Dr. Smith received
monetary rewards for limiting specialist referrals); (3) physician malpractice independent
of the HMO's actions (i.e., Dr. Jenkins nicked Mr. Johnson's artery); (4) the HMO could
be liable for negligent physician selection (by approving bypass only if performed by Dr.
Jenkins, the HMO, in effect, determined which physician would operate on Mr. Johnson);
and (5) vicarious liability of the HMO for Dr. Jenkins's actions.
111. The duty analysis may be parsed into two components: (1) Does a duty exist?;
and (2) What is the standard of care? See Mihaly, supra note 12, at 1290. Courts will
impose a duty on those responsible for utilization review decisions where it is clearly
foreseeable that UR decisions may cause injury to patients. If a court concludes that a
duty exists, it will have two options in selecting a duty of care. The court may find either
a procedural standard, such as a standard of care in the design and implementation of the
utilization review program, or a medical standard, such as the standard of care for
determining medical necessity, or both. See id. at 1291-92. Although some courts have
held that UROs owe a duty towards patients, see infra Part IV.C, at least one court found
that an HMO acted in bad faith in denying coverage by looking to the HMO's coverage
booklet; the coverage booklet had indicated that the HMO would pay for the procedure.
See, e.g., Fox v. HealthNet, No. 219692 (Sup. Ct., Riverside County, California, 1993),
noted in 1993 WL 794305. Under this approach, UROs may avoid liability by altering
their guidelines. The question remains, however, whether to impose a nondelegable duty
of care on UROs.
112. See Battaglia, supra note 12 (discussing the current state of common law tort
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IV. ERISA
The primary roadblock to enforcing a utilization review
organization's duty of care to patients is ERISA. Courts have
invoked ERISA's preemption and civil enforcement provisions to bar
monetary recovery for tort claims against payers of self-insured plans
and UROs. The following discussion focuses on the judiciary's
interpretations of the preemption and civil enforcement provisions
for breach of fiduciary duty and how they apply to utilization review
liability.
ERISA applies to pension plans and welfare plans, the latter of
which include health plans sponsored by an employer (self-insured
health plans) or by an insurer (insured health plans). 4 Whereas
ERISA provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme for pension
plans, only the disclosure, reporting, and fiduciary duty requirements
apply to health plans. 15 Therefore, ERISA does not require that an
employer offer a health plan or that the plan provide for certain
benefits.
ERISA's primary purpose is to "protect ... the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries" 116 by
claims against UROs and payers, primarily managed care organizations in further detail);
Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285 (1995) (same); Susan 0.
Scheutzow, A Framework for Analysis of ERISA Preemption in Suits Against Health
Plans and a Callfor Reform, 11 J.L. & HEALTH 195 (1996-97) (same).
113. Because rising health care costs take a greater toll on small businesses than on
large employers, see Slivinska, supra note 13, at 333-34, the opportunity for small
businesses to establish cooperatives for the purpose of creating employee benefit plans
may expand the number of employees covered under an ERISA plan.
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1994). The key difference between a self-insured
and an insured health plan is who assumes the financial risks of the plan. Under a self-
insured plan, the employer assumes the risks whereas an insurer assumes the risks under
an insured plan. ERISA applies to roughly 65% of employer plans. See Harshbarger,
supra note 86, at 193.
115. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1029, 1101-1109 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). Under
ERISA, every plan must furnish written notice to any participant of the reasons
underlying a denial of benefits and afford a "reasonable opportunity" to the participant
"for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the
claim." 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994). The plan administrator must provide each participant
with a summary plan description, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1021(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998), and file
with the Secretary of Labor the summary plan description, a plan description, and an
annual report, see id. § 1021(b) (West Supp. 1998).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640 (discussing the purpose of ERISA). The Act defines a
"participant" as any employee, former employee, member or former member of an
employee organization who may become eligible to receive a benefit from an employee
benefit plan that covers such employees or members, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive such a benefit. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994). A "beneficiary" means
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creating disclosure and reporting requirements, "by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.""'  Although
employers are not required to provide benefit plans to their
employees or maintain a certain level of benefits once a plan is
offered, employers who do establish a plan must comply with various
funding, reporting, and disclosure requirements." 8 In an effort to
encourage the creation of employee benefit plans by reducing
inefficiencies, Congress established uniform statutory requirements"19
by enacting sweeping preemption provisions.20
a person chosen by a participant or by the terms of an employee benefit plan to receive or
be entitled to receive benefits under the plan. See id. § 1002(8) (1994).
117. Id. § 1001(b) (1994).
118. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1031, 1051-1086 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
119. Congress feared that compliance with different federal and state laws would
encourage employers to shift the cost of the administrative burdens to employees by
lowering the benefits levels. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1987). Some courts have stressed the goal of uniformity over the goal to protect
participants. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332-33 (5th
Cir. 1992).
120. Occasionally, courts have confused "conflict preemption" with "complete
preemption." Section 514 of ERISA refers to the federal defense of preemption, known
as "conflict preemption." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). Under this
doctrine, a claim preempted by ERISA is dismissed. In contrast, "complete preemption"
is a jurisdictional doctrine. A defendant in state court may remove a claim to federal
court if the complaint raises a question pertaining to a federal statute, such as ERISA
(the "well-pleaded complaint" rule). If, however, the state court can recharacterize the
suit as an ERISA § 502(a) claim for benefits-§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
(1994), provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action "to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan"-it may
remove to federal court even if a federal question is not raised on the face of the
plaintiff's complaint. Id This is the "complete preemption" exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995); Dukes v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 352 (3rd Cir. 1995). A complaint that can be
recharacterized as a claim for benefits may be subject to complete preemption but not
§ 514 conflict preemption because it is, in fact, an ERISA claim. Instead, the plaintiff, if
successful, could only receive remedies available under ERISA-typically the award of
benefits originally denied. The sole limitation is that the claim for benefits must be
brought against the plan, a plan fiduciary, or a plan administrator. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(d) (1994).
Congress debated and enacted ERISA in the days preceding and following
Watergate. Some commentators have proposed that Watergate interrupted congressional
activities to such an extent that Congress did not adequately consider the consequences of
a broad preemption provision. See Donald J. McNeil, Note, ERISA Preemption of State
Vacation Pay Laws: California Hospital Association v. Henning, 16 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
387, 419 (1985). As a result, these authors contend that the legislators' intent is
unreliable. See id. at 418-19.
The initial bills that passed the House and Senate, however, included more
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A. Preemption
The preemption provisions are comprised of three components:
(1) § 514(a) preempts all state laws that "relate to" any employee
benefit plan;"' (2) § 514(b)(2)(A), the "savings clause," removes
state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities from ERISA's
preemptive field;" and (3) § 514(b)(2)(B), the "deemer clause,"
prohibits a state law from deeming an employee benefit plan to be an
insurance company by purporting to regulate the business of
insurance.11 The Supreme Court, however, has read the deemer
clause to mean that state insurance laws may regulate insured plans
but may not regulate self-insured plans,"' thereby affording self-
insured plans greater protection from the reach of state laws under
ERISA.
For many years, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted and
applied ERISA's preemption provisions. In Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., z the Court noted that state laws that affect
conservative preemption provisions. Under the Senate bill, preemption would only have
applied to state laws that related to the administration of an ERISA plan, whereas under
the House version, state laws regarding topics covered by the Act would have been
preempted. See Harshbarger, supra note 86, at 215-16. Arguably, because both Houses
expanded ERISA preemption from their original versions, Congress intended to employ
broad preemption. See id. Furthermore, the bill's primary sponsors stated that broad
preemption was an important part of the legislation. See id. at 216-17; Seema R. Shah,
Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: A
Response to PacifiCare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1545, 1552-53 & nn.45,
48 (1996). Judicial interpretation of the scope of the preemption provisions will depend,
therefore, on the courts' view on congressional intent. In the past, the Supreme Court
adopted the view that Congress intended to create broad preemption. See Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983);
Alessi v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); infra notes 125-31 and
accompanying text.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
122. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). According to the Supreme Court, a state law
regulates insurance if: (1) the practice at issue transfers or spreads a policyholder's risk;
(2) "the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured;" and (3) the practice is restricted to members of the insurance industry. Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (describing the three-part test
outlined in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211-17,
20-24 (1979) (interpreting the meaning of "business of insurance" in § 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act)). For a discussion of whether utilization review constitutes the
business of insurance, see Blum, supra note 55, at 205-06.
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
124. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,747 (1985) (holding
that ERISA did not preempt a Massachusetts statute requiring all group health insurance
plans and employee health care plans to provide certain minimum mental health care
benefits except as the statute pertained to self-insured health plans).
125. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
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employee benefit plans in only an indirect manner still fall within the
scope of § 514(a).12 6 This expansive approach continued in Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,127 where the Court established that "a law
'relate[s] to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."'"
Applying this framework to state common law tort and contract
claims, a unanimous Court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux129
held that common law causes of action based on allegations of
improper benefits claim processing relate to an employee benefit
plan and, thus, are preempted by ERISA. 1"0  Justice O'Connor
indicated that § 514 was not limited to "state laws specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans."'31 After several years of
consistently employing a broad reading of § 514(a), the Court
vacillated for the next several years 32 until its ruling in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.133  In Travelers, the Supreme Court expanded its
preemption analysis to include an examination of both the statutory
language of the provision in question and ERISA's underlying
purposes. A unanimous Court held that ERISA did not preempt a
New York law requiring the addition of surcharges to hospital bills of
126. See id. at 525.
127. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
128. Id. at 96-97. Although stressing the broad preemptive effect of ERISA, the Court
qualified this premise by stating that some laws might "affect employee benefit plans in
too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to'
the plan." Id. at 100 n.21.
129. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
130. See id. at 47-48.
131. Id.
132. In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), a divided Court held that
ERISA did not preempt a Maine severance pay statute because the statute only
mandated a one-time, lump-sum payment. Because the statute did not require an
administrative scheme, the law concerned "benefits" and not "benefit plans." Id. at 11-
12. Justice Brennan, writing for a 5-4 majority, focused his analysis on whether
preemption would further the purpose of § 514. See id. at 8-15. Brennan concluded that
the Maine statute would not subject employee benefit plans to a non-uniform set of
regulations. See id. at 14-15. The Court's more narrow approach continued in Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988), where the Court held that
ERISA did not preempt Georgia's general garnishment law. See id. at 831-32.
In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990), the Court returned to its expansive
analysis under Shaw when it held that ERISA preempted a Pennsylvania statute
precluding subrogation of an individual's tort claim. See id. at 65. The Court continued
this broad interpretation of § 514 in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145
(1990), reaching its zenith in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,
506 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1992). After this case, the Supreme Court gradually read the
preemptive scope of § 514 more narrowly.
133. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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patients covered by commercial insurance plans but not to bills
covered by Blue Cross or Blue Shield plans.'3 The New York statute
had only an "indirect economic influence" that "[did] not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself.1' 35 Justice Souter wrote that the
focus of preemption analysis is congressional intent and not ERISA's
language.'36 He noted that the term "relate[s] to" in § 514(a) was
difficult to define; if this "unhelpful text" "were taken to extend to
the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical
purposes pre-emption would never run its course.' 1 37  Citing
Ingersoll-Rand and Representative Dent and Senator Williams,
sponsors of the Act, Justice Souter indicated that the primary
underlying rationale for preemption "was to... permit the nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans" by eliminating
conflicting state regulation. 3 The Supreme Court's emphasis on
congressional intent and statutory purpose in Travelers marked a
shift from the earlier textualist interpretation of the preemption
provisions. The Court sought to clarify this inquiry in California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, Inc.13 1
In Dillingham, the Court examined whether ERISA's
preemption provision supplanted California's prevailing wage law.
Under this law, a contractor on a public works project must pay its
workers the current wage in the project's area. The contractor could,
however, pay a lower wage to those workers who took part in an
approved apprenticeship program. 40
134. See id. at 649.
135. Id. at 559.
136. See id. at 655-56.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 656-57.
139. 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
140. See id. at 835. Dillingham Construction was awarded a public works contract for
the construction of the Sonoma County Main Adult Detention Facility. See id. at 836.
Dillingham subcontracted electronic installation work to Sound Systems Media, who paid
its apprentices an apprentice wage provided in its collective bargaining agreement and in
affiliation with a joint apprenticeship committee. See id. Sound Systems Media did not,
however, seek nor receive approval for its apprenticeship program from the State's
apprenticeship agency, the California Apprenticeship Council, as required by California
regulations, until a later date. See id. The State issued a notice of noncompliance to
Sound Systems Media and Dillingham, charging Sound Systems Media with violating
California's prevailing wage law for paying apprentices from a non-approved program
lower wages than required by law. See id. Dillingham and Sound Systems Media filed
suit alleging that the committee was an employee welfare benefit plan and that
California's prevailing statute "related to" the plan and, therefore, was preempted by
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The Dillingham Court outlined a two-part inquiry to determine
whether the ERISA preemption provision applies to a particular
state law: A" 'law "relate[s]" to a covered employee benefit plan for
purposes of § 514(a) "if it [1] has a connection with or [2] reference to
such a plan." ' "141 A state law "refers" to an ERISA plan if it acts
"immediately and exclusively" on the plan or the plan is "essential to
the law's operation."'42 Even if the state law does not refer to an
ERISA plan, it will be preempted if it has a "connection with" such a
plan.143
Under the "connection with" part of the inquiry, a court must
use a two-step analysis, examining first ERISA's objective as a guide
to state laws Congress intended should survive ERISA preemption
and, second, "the nature of the effect" the state law would have on an
ERISA plan.'" Under this approach, a court must first appraise
whether ERISA's provisions or its legislative history indicate a
congressional intent to preempt the type of state law at issue.1 45
ERISA. See id. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency. See
Dillingham Constr., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 778 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that ERISA preempted the statute. See Dillingham
Constr., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 57 F.3d 712, 721 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that ERISA did not preempt California's prevailing
wage statute because the statute neither referred to nor had a connection with an ERISA
plan. See Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 835.
141. Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 837 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983))).
142. Id. at 838. Under this part of the test, the Court has held as preempted the
District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Equity Amendment Act of 1990, § 2(c)(2),
D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp. 1992), which required employers who furnished
health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent coverage for injured
employees eligible for workers' compensation benefits, see Greater Washington Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. at 126-27; a Georgia statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982), that
singled out employee benefit plans for protective treatment under state garnishment
procedures because of the statute's express reference to ERISA plans, see Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841 (1988); and a state wrongful
discharge claim, see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,145 (1990).
143. Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 838.
144. Id. Under this analysis, the Court held preempted New York's Human Rights
Law, N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 and Supp. 1982-1983), which
prohibited employers from organizing their employee benefit plans in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, see Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108; Pennsylvania's Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987), which precluded
subrogation against a person's tort recovery arising out of an automobile accident, see
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990); and New Jersey's Workers' Compensation
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980-1981), which prohibited plans from
offsetting benefits by the amount of worker compensation payments, see Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 506 (1981).
145. See Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 840-41.
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Although the Supreme Court recognized an underlying presumption
not to preempt a state law pertaining to an area of traditional state
regulation, such a finding would not in itself insulate that law against
preemption. 46 Under the second step, if Congress did not intend to
preempt the type of state law at issue, that law would still be
preempted if it dictates the choices facing the plan or the plan
administrator and thereby regulates the plan itself.147
The Dillingham decision probably signals an attempt by the
Court to bring ERISA preemption analysis more in line with
traditional preemption analysis.148 The Court recently affirmed its
two-part inquiry in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical
Services Fund.1 49
B. Fiduciary Duty
Although ERISA's preemption provisions do not shield from
liability plan administrators who breach their fiduciary duty, the
limited application of the duty and insufficient remedies may furnish
administrators indirect protection in some instances. A person is a
fiduciary to the extent he or she uses any "discretionary authority or
discretionary control" regarding the plan's management,
management or disposition of plan assets, or administration of such
plan.151 Under § 1104(a)(1), plan fiduciaries have a duty to act
"solely in the interests of the [plan] participants and beneficiaries." '151
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 843 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, In,
505 U.S. 504,518 (1992) (discussing the traditional preemption analysis); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (same).
149. 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1751 (1997).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). Section 1002(21)(A) states in part:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994). Section 1104(a)(1) states in part:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-(A) for the exclusive purpose
of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii)
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims ....
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Sections 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3) provide the means to enforce
ERISA's fiduciary standards. 52
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,'53 the
Supreme Court held that under a § 1132(a)(2) claim, relief for breach
of duty is available only to the plan as a whole and not to the
individual participants.54 The Court concluded that Congress did not
grant a cause of action under § 1109(a)-and, therefore under
§ 1132(a)(2)-for "extracontractual damages" resulting from the
improper or untimely processing of benefit claims. 5 In Varity Corp.
v. Howe, 56  however, the Supreme Court determined that
§ 1132(a)(3) permits individual remedies.'57 Justice Breyer concluded
Id.
152. Section 1132(a)(2) states that a civil action may be brought "by the Secretary, or
by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this
title." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994). Section 1132(a)(3) provides that a civil action may
be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary: "(A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan." Id. § 1132(a)(3).
153. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). In this case, Doris Russell received plan benefits for
disability arising from a back ailment. See id. at 136. Based on a report by an orthopedic
surgeon, Massachusetts Mutual terminated Mrs. Russell's benefits. See id. Subsequently,
Mrs. Russell's psychiatrist sent a report to Massachusetts Mutual stating that Mrs. Russell
suffered from a psychosomatic disability with physical manifestations rather than a true
orthopedic disorder. See id. After a second psychiatrist confirmed these findings, the
plan administrator reinstated Mrs. Russell's benefits, including retroactive payment. See
id. Although Mrs. Russell received the full benefits to which she was contractually
entitled, she filed a claim alleging injury arising from the improper refusal to pay benefits.
See id.
154. Id. at 140. Because Mrs. Russell expressly disclaimed reliance on § 1132(a)(3),
the Court did not address whether that section provided for individual remedies. See id.
at 139.
155. Id. at 148. Section 1109(a) states:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the
plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary, which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
156. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
157. See id. at 1076. In Varity, Varity Corporation ("Varity") transferred its money-
losing divisions to one of its subsidiaries, Massey-Combines. See id. at 1068. Varity then
convinced employees to change their employee benefit plans to Massey-Combines by
offering assurances that the benefits would remain secure. Massey-Combines was,
however, insolvent from the outset. See id. at 1068-69. When the company entered
receivership in its second year, the employees who had transferred their plans lost their
employee welfare benefits. See id. at 1069. These employees filed a claim against Varity
for breach of fiduciary duty and requested "appropriate equitable relief' under
1999]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that § 1132(a)(3) acts as a "safety net, offering appropriate equitable
relief for injuries caused by violations that [§ 1132] does not
elsewhere adequately remedy.""15 Although Justice Breyer found it
unimaginable that Congress would intend to shield breaches of
fiduciary responsibility that injure individuals by denying such
individuals a remedy,1 9 the Court did not specify what remedies are
available to injured beneficiaries under § 1132(a)(3). 60 Moreover,
Varity did not outline what constitutes fiduciary obligations or
address whether individuals may bring claims regarding future
benefits. Several post-Varity cases have tried to fill in these gaps.161
Yet the absence of a clear blueprint for fiduciary responsibilities as
well as potential limitations on available remedies for breach of duty
do not constitute the sole deficiencies in ERISA's fiduciary
provisions. The central precept of ERISA's fiduciary law, the
exclusive benefit rule, is at odds with the reality of modern employee
benefit trust.162
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule requires plan fiduciaries to
discharge their duties solely in the interest of the plan's participants
and beneficiaries.63 The drafters of ERISA sought to "'apply rules
and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern
the conduct of fiduciaries.' "I' As a result, ERISA's exclusive
§ 1132(a)(3). See id.
158. Id. at 1078.
159. See id.
160. In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court cautioned against expanding equitable
remedies and suggested that "appropriate equitable relief" under § 1132(a)(3) means
traditional remedies, such as injunction, back pay, and mandamus. See Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). Trust law, however, permits make-whole relief in certain
instances. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Ina, 965 F.2d 1321, 1336 (5th Cir. 1992).
For a brief description of trust law duties, see infra text accompanying notes 165-68.
161. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S. Ct. 1783, 1790 (1996) (holding that plan
sponsor does not act as a fiduciary when amending an ERISA plan); Shea v. Esensten,
107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty includes the
failure to disclose the plan's financial incentives when those incentives serve to discourage
the treating physician from providing essential health care referrals for disorders covered
under the plan); McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that relief available under § 1132(a)(3) is limited to equitable and not
compensatory damages); Coyne v. Delaney Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir.
1996) (finding that a sponsor does not become a fiduciary by undertaking settlor-type
activities such as crafting benefits); Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 971 F. Supp. 623, 640 (D.
Mass. 1997) (holding that plan fiduciaries must disclose medical necessity guidelines used
by its utilization review process when requested by a participant and that such failure to
disclose is subject to § 1132(c) civil remedies).
162. For a detailed analysis, see Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988).
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994); supra note 151 (quoting relevant language).
164. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 162, at 1108 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, pt.
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benefit rule adopts trust law's duty of loyalty.'65 An employee benefit
plan differs, however, from an ordinary trust. Under an ordinary
private trust, the property owner, or settlor, transfers property for the
benefit of one or more beneficiaries to a third party, the trustee. The
rationale behind imposing fiduciary obligations on the trustee stems
from the typical trust creation scenario wherein the settlor may die or
the beneficiaries are incapable of managing the funds. Under such
circumstances, the parties involved lack the ability to monitor the
trustee. To substitute for such monitoring deficiencies and to prevent
the trustee from engaging in self-interested behavior at the expense
of the beneficiaries, trust law imposes an irrebuttable presumption of
wrongdoing whenever there exists a conflict of interest on the part of
the trustee.166 Under an employee benefit plan, however, the
employer's and employee's interests do not fully align. 67 The
employer is the settlor, a beneficiary,68 and, sometimes, a fiduciary.
Whereas in a private trust, the settlor's welfare is maximized if the
beneficiaries receive all the benefits from the trust, in an employee
benefit plan, the employer's welfare is maximized if it can either limit
or divert some of the benefits to its own pocke ts that would otherwise
flow to the beneficiaries (or participants). The private trust also
typically involves a small number of beneficiaries with similar
interests. Under an employee benefit plan, different classes of
employees share dissimilar interests. For example, young workers
may prefer to receive a greater bulk of compensation in the form of
family leave time whereas older employees may prefer greater
emphasis on health care benefits. In addition, when an employee
becomes ill, the interests of that participant and the plan may
diverge. The sick employee may want the plan to spend more money
on his health care whereas the plan, in an effort to conserve resources
for the other participants, may conclude that the other participants
would receive a greater benefit if the sick employee received less
medical care.
A larger conflict of interest arises when independent UROs act
5, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,5076).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1114-15.
167. Employers and employees share certain mutual interests. For example, employee
benefits may reduce employee turnover, thereby decreasing employers' training costs and
increasing employee satisfaction. Moreover, the compensation employees receive
through health benefits is a tax advantage for their employer. See id. at 1117-18.
168. The employer can be viewed as a beneficiary because an employee benefit plan
comprises a portion of the total package that an employer agrees to pay an employee as
compensation. See id. at 1117.
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as fiduciaries, 169 although physician and nurse reviewers who make
decisions based on established plan guidelines arguably are not acting
as fiduciaries.170 Though self-dealing behavior by a URO may result
in employee dissatisfaction, the URO lies further removed from
employee objections than the employer. Moreover, the URO does
not experience the training and supervision costs of employee
turnover. Therefore, the current schema of ERISA fiduciary duties
169. As the Corcoran court noted:
[I]n any plan benefit determination, there is always some tension between the
interest of the beneficiary in obtaining quality medical care and the interest of
the plan in preserving the pool of funds available to compensate all
beneficiaries. In a prospective review context, with its greatly increased ability
to deter the beneficiary (correctly or not) from embarking on a course of
treatment recommended by the beneficiary's physician, the tension between
interest of the beneficiary and that of the plan is exacerbated. A system which
would, at least in some circumstances, compensate the beneficiary who changes
course based upon a wrong call for the costs of that call might ease the tension
between the conflicting interests of the beneficiary and the plan.
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992).
170. The Department of Labor published the following question and answer regarding
ERISA's fiduciary obligations:
Q: Are persons who have no power to make any decision as to plan policy,
interpretations, practices or procedures, but who perform the following
administrative functions for an employee benefit plan, within a framework of
policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other persons,
fiduciaries with respect to the plan:
(1) Application of rules determining eligibility for participation or benefits;
(2) Calculation of services and compensation credits for benefits;
(3) Preparation of employee communications material;
(4) Maintenance of participants' service and employment records;
(5) Preparation of reports required by government agencies;
(6) Calculation of benefits;
(7) Orientation of new participants and advising participants of their rights
and options under the plan;
(8) Collection of contributions and application of contributions as provided
in the plan;
(9) Preparation of reports concerning participants' benefits;
(10) Processing of claims; and
(11) Making recommendations to others for decisions with respect to plan
administration?
A: No. Only persons who perform one or more of the functions described in
section 3(21)(A) of the Act with respect to an employee benefit plan are
fiduciaries. Therefore, a person who performs purely ministerial functions such
as the types described above for an employee benefit plan within a framework of
policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other persons
is not a fiduciary because such person does not have discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of the plan, does not exercise any
authority or control respecting management or disposition of the assets of the
plan, and does not render investment advice with respect to any money or other
property of the plan and has no authority or responsibility to do so.
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1998).
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misreads the conflicts of interest inherent in employee health benefit
plans as well as the cost-control mentality of today's health care
system. Any reform directed at ERISA's fiduciary duties must
address both who should be a fiduciary and what should comprise the
duties of a fiduciary.
C. Liability for Utilization Review Decisions Under State Law
Wickline v. State of California171 was the first instance where a
court determined that third-party payers could be held liable for
medically inappropriate decisions resulting from defects in the design
or implementation of cost-containment mechanisms. In this case,
Lois Wickline was admitted to a local hospital with back and leg
problems by her family practitioner, Dr. Daniels, and diagnosed with
Leriche's syndrome'72 by Dr. Polonsky, a vascular surgeon.'7" After
approval by Medi-Cal, California's state medical assistance program,
Dr. Polonsky performed a surgical procedure on Mrs. Wickline
wherein a portion of her artery was removed and replaced with a
synthetic graft.'74 Dr. Polonsky reoperated on Mrs. Wickline later
that same day to remove a clot that had formed postoperatively and,
several days later, performed a lumbar sympathectomy, the severing
of a chain of nerves near the spinal cord, to treat persistent leg pain
and arterial spasms."5 Near the time of discharge, Dr. Polonsky
concluded, and Dr. Daniels and a third physician agreed, that Mrs.
Wickline should remain in the hospital for an additional eight days
for observation. 76 After performing a prospective utilization review,
Medi-Cal rejected the request for an eight day extension but
authorized an additional four days of hospitalizationY.7 None of Mrs.
Wickline's physicians tried to obtain a further extension of her
hospital stay."78 After returning home, Mrs. Wickline developed
recurrent pain in her right leg and the leg progressively turned gray
and then blue.179 Nine days after her discharge, Mrs. Wickline was
171. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986).
172. Leriche's syndrome is hip, thigh, and buttock pain when walking as the result of
occlusion of the distal aorta from arteriosclerosis. The aorta is the principal and largest
artery bringing oxygenated blood from the heart to the rest of the body. Arteriosclerosis
is hardening and narrowing of the arterial wall. See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 1492-93 (Kurt J. Isselbacher ed., 10th ed. 1983).
173. See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 812-13.
176. See id. at 813.
177. See id. at 814.
178. See id. at 815.
179. See id. at 816.
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readmitted to the hospital where she eventually had her right leg
amputated above the knee because of clotting in the leg and an
infection at the graft site.18° Mrs. Wickline brought a claim against
Medi-Cal for negligently discontinuing her Medi-Cal eligibility,
thereby resulting in her discharge from the hospital.18' As a result,
Mrs. Wickline argued that she suffered clot formation in her right leg
necessitating amputation of that leg."s The trial court found for the
plaintiff.'8' A California Court of Appeal reversed. 1,4
The court of appeal determined that under California law, all
persons must use ordinary care to prevent harm to others as a result
of their conduct.185 Persons are exempt from this duty if there is a
statutory exception or an exception should be made based on public
policy."8 6 Although the court agreed that third-party payers may be
held liable when medically inappropriate decisions arise from defects
in the design or implementation of cost-containment measures,", the
court ruled that the statutory law governing the Medi-Cal program
created an exception to tort law liability by permitting Medi-Cal to
deny benefits when its decision accorded with the standards of
medical practice in the community.8 ' The court went on to note that
the "stakes ... are much higher" for prospective review than for the
retrospective review process. 89 An error in determining medical
necessity following retrospective review can lead to the wrongful
withholding of payment, but an incorrect decision from prospective
review may lead to the wrongful withholding of necessary care and to
subsequent injury to the patient. 90 The court concluded, "[w]hile we
180. See id.
181. See id. 811.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 820.
185. See id. at 818.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 819. The court noted:
[t]he patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which should
have been provided is not provided should recover for the injuries suffered from
all those responsible for the deprivation of such care, including, when
appropriate, health care payors. Third party payors of health care services can
be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from
defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for
example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care
are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.
Id.
188. See id. at 820; see also Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879
(Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the legal and factual components of the Wickline case).
189. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
190. See id. at 812.
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recognize, realistically, that cost consciousness has become a
permanent feature of the health care system, it is essential that cost
limitation programs not be permitted to corrupt medical
judgment."19'
The California Court of Appeal revisited the issue of utilization
reviewer liability in Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California.9
Howard Wilson was hospitalized for the treatment of major
depression, and his attending physician determined that Mr. Wilson
required three to four weeks of inpatient care. 93 Mr. Wilson's
insurance company disagreed, however, and denied payment for
hospitalization beyond ten days. 194 Because Mr. Wilson could not
afford to pay for additional inpatient care, he was discharged from
the hospital.'95 Three weeks later, he committed suicide. 96 Mr.
Wilson's family brought suit for breach of contract, inducement of
breach of contract, and wrongful death against the insurance
company, the utilization review organization, and the physician who
determined the denial of payment by the utilization review
organization. 97 The trial court granted defendants' motions for
summary judgment based upon the holding in Wickline.98 The court
of appeals reversed by limiting the holding of Wickline to its facts.
The Wilson court distinguished three key components that
distinguished it from Wickline. First, Wickline held as a matter of law
that the discharge decision in that case met the standard of care for
physicians, while Wilson found no evidence to support that the
discharge decision was within the medical standard of care.199
Second, although a statutory exception applied in Wickline, no such
exception was available in Wilson."0 Instead, the contract between
Mr. Wilson and the insurance company imposed a duty on the insurer
191. Id at 820. The court stated, however, that a physician who complies with a third-
party payer decision that is contrary to his or her medical judgment, as was the case with
Dr. Polonsky, retains the ultimate responsibility for the patient's care. See id. at 819. The
court's dicta implies that treating physicians possess an obligation to appeal limitations
imposed by third-party payers that run counter to the physician's medical judgment.
192. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990).
193. See id. at 877.
194. See id.
195. See id at 877-78.
196. See id. 878.
197. See id. 880-81.
198. See id. 878.
199. See id. at 882; Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
200. See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879; Wickline v. State of Cal., 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 820
(Ct. App. 1986).
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to provide funds. 0 1 Finally, in Wickline, the Medi-Cal review process
did not "corrupt medical judgment."2" The sole basis for Mr.
Wilson's discharge stemmed, however, from the absence of funds to
pay for continued inpatient care.0 3 The Wilson court shifted the
focus on the issue of third-party payer liability from the
characterization of the decision-making conduct to whether the
decision to deny benefits was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's
injury.2" Therefore, the court rejected the Wickline dicta which
stated that the responsibility for discharge lies exclusively with the
treating physician.0 5 Because a triable issue remained as to whether
the refusal to extend Mr. Wilson's inpatient treatment was a
"substantial factor" in causing Mr. Wilson's death, the court
remanded the case.20 6
Several courts have subsequently held UROs liable for their
decisions.2° In Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners of the State of
201. See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
202- Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820; see Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
203. See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
204. The court adopted the test for joint tort liability from the Second Restatement of
Torts:
"The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his [or
her] conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and, (b) there is
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which
his negligence has resulted in the harm."
Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431) (1965)
(alteration in original)).
205. See id. The court also left unresolved whether a treating physician incurs liability
if she fails to appeal a utilization review decision that runs counter to her medical
judgment. See id. at 884-85. Implicit in Wilson and Wickline, however, is the court's
acceptance of concurrent utilization review as an appropriate method of health care cost
containment.
206. Id. at 885. After the appellate court's decision to remand, the URO settled with
the Wilsons. See Frankel, supra note 40, at 1309. In 1992, a jury found the insurer liable
for tortious breach of contract. See David Azevedo, Courts Let UR Firms Off the Hook-
And Leave Doctors On, MED. ECON., Jan. 25, 1993, at 30, 42. The parties subsequently
settled. See Frankel, supra note 40, at 1309.
207. See, e.g., Fox v. HealthNet, No. 219692 (Sup. Ct., Riverside County, California,
1993), noted in 1993 WL 794305, where a California jury awarded over $89 million in
damages against an HMO. The IMO had denied coverage for a breast cancer patient's
bone marrow transplant on the basis that the treatment was experimental. The HMO's
coverage booklet indicated, however, that the procedure was covered. The jury awarded
$12 million in compensatory damages for bad faith, breach of contract, and reckless
infliction of emotional distress, and $77 million in punitive damages. See Michael Meyer
& Andrew Murr, Not My Health Care, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 36, 36; Christine
Woolsey, Jury Hits HMO for Coverage Denial, Bus. INS., Jan. 3, 1994, at 1, 23; see also
Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767NM-2, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989), reprinted in
BARRY F. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE




Arizona,208 an Arizona court of appeals held that a decision to deny
precertification for gallbladder surgery was a medical decision. 9 Dr.
Murphy, the medical director of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona,
declined to precertify patient S.B. for gallbladder surgery,
determining that the procedure was not "medically necessary,"
contrary to the advice of S.B.'s surgeon, Dr. Johnson, and her
referring physician.210  Dr. Johnson performed the operation and
Blue Cross eventually paid the claim.2 ' In response to a letter sent
by Dr. Johnson complaining that Dr. Murphy displayed
unprofessional conduct and medical incompetence regarding S.B.'s
precertification request, the Arizona Board of Medical Examiners
("BOMEX") issued a letter of concern to Dr. Murphy.2  Dr.
Murphy filed a lawsuit in superior court alleging that BOMEX had
violated his due process rights.1 3 After losing on a summary
judgment motion, BOMEX appealed 1 4 The Arizona court of
appeals determined that Dr. Murphy was an employee who makes
medical decisions as to whether or not procedures are medically
necessary.215 The court held that Dr. Murphy's conclusion was a
medical decision because he had substituted his medical judgment for
that of S.B.'s doctors and determined that the gallbladder surgery
was not medically necessary. 16 The court was not persuaded by the
fact that Dr. Murphy was following Blue Cross's contract.
217
The Wyoming Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Insurance Co.218 Dr. Hollifield,
Larry Long's neurologist, recommended that Mr. Long undergo back
surgery for a herniated disc which caused Mr. Long to experience
chronic pain.21 9  Great-West, Mr. Long's insurer, required pre-
authorization for surgery, which was administered by a utilization
208. 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
209. See id at 536.
210. See id. at 532-33.
211. See id. at 533.
212. See id. at 533-34.
213. See i. at 534.
214. See id. at 535. The principal issue on appeal was whether or not BOMEX had
jurisdiction over Dr. Murphy. See id.
215. See id. at 536.
216. See id.
217. See i. at 532, 536; see also Morris v. District of Columbia Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d
364, 368 (D.C. 1997) (holding that under certain circumstances, a medical administrator
of an insurer who monitors and routinely questions physicians' treatment decisions could
be found to have practiced medicine).
218. 957 P.2d 823 (Wyo. 1998).
219. See id. at 824.
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review program, Health Care Review Service ("HCRS"). 0 Surgery
performed without pre-authorization would be paid at a sixty percent
penalty rate.22' HCRS denied authorization and instead determined
that Mr. Long should receive treatment with steroid injections.2z Dr.
Steffen, an anesthesiologist, informed Mr. Long that he could not
administer the injections because he believed that the injections
posed a risk but offered no benefit.' After several attempts by Mr.
Long to obtain approval for surgery, HCRS recommended treatment
with physical therapy.224 Dr. Metz, a neurosurgeon, examined Long
and determined that physical therapy would not be beneficial and
that surgery was the appropriate course of treatment. 225 Mr. Long's
condition progressively deteriorated resulting in weakness of his left
foot and increased pain.z6 He, therefore, underwent surgery which
Great-West paid at the sixty percent penalty rate.27 Mr. Long
brought suit against Great-West under various theories, including
breach of contract.2, Great-West filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that Long had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies under the contract.229 Long appealed after losing on the
summary judgment motion at the trial court level.230 The Wyoming
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the grievance
procedure in Great-West's contract applied to claims for payment
and not to treatment decisions during the utilization review
process.231 The court ruled that the utilization review process entails
involvement in medical decisions by the insurer's administrator and is
beyond the traditional realm of insurance claims and coverage. 2
These cases suggest, therefore, that some courts now view utilization
review decisions, or at least precertification determinations, as
medical decisions.
D. Liability for Utilization Review Decisions Under ERISA
ERISA preemption has provided a shield for UROs against state
220. See id.










231. See id. at 832-33. Long, therefore, could pursue a judicial remedy. See id. at 833.
232 See id. at 832.
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common law-based tort claims. Under preemption analysis, either
the suit is dismissed for failure to state a claim or the remedies
offered under ERISA prove insufficient to warrant further
litigation.3
In Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.,Z34 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed whether ERISA preempted a Louisiana tort
action for wrongful death. In Corcoran, a utilization review
organization denied coverage for hospitalization of a pregnant
mother.235 While the mother was at home, the fetus went into distress
and died. 6 The Corcorans argued that the URO's refusal to permit
hospitalization was an erroneous medical decision.237 The URO,
however, characterized itself as a plan fiduciary that performs
administrative duties akin to claims handling?'5 The court of appeals
did not fully agree with either party. Instead, the court determined
that although the URO makes medical decisions, it does so in the
context of determining whether benefits are available under the plan;
accordingly, the court held that ERISA preempted the Corcorans'
claims.' 9 The court of appeals also looked to the purpose of ERISA
to buttress its decision. Acknowledging that Congress's goal to
create a uniform federal scheme to regulate employee benefit plans
required a broad reading of the preemption provision,240 the court
concluded that imposing liability on the URO would threaten this
scheme by placing employee benefit plans at risk from different state
liability laws and would, therefore, increase costs for health benefit
plans using cost-containment mechanisms.24' The absence of a
remedy under ERISA for medical malpractice committed in
connection with a plan benefit determination,24 2 the possibility that
233. Arguably, UROs may escape liability if they are deemed ERISA fiduciaries. For
example, under the rationale of McManus v. Travelers Health Network, 742 F. Supp. 377
(W.D. Tex. 1990), "a person is a fiduciary if that person has discretion in deciding
whether claims are to be paid or establishes the policies and procedures to be followed in
evaluating claims." Id. at 382; see also supra Part IV.B (discussing this fiduciary duty).
234. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
235. See id. at 1324.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 1326.
238. See id. at 1329-30.
239. See id. at 1331. The court of appeals concluded that the Corcorans sought to
recover for a tort allegedly committed in the process of handling a benefits determination.
The Corcoran court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987), where the Court had held that ERISA preempted state
law claims alleging improper handling of benefit claims. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
240. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
241. See id. at 1332-33.
242. See id. at 1338. The court stated:
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imposing liability on UROs would deter poor quality medical
decisions, and the greater impact of prospective review on
beneficiaries, as compared to retrospective review, 243 did not dissuade
the court from its holding that- ERISA preempted the Corcorans'
claims.244 The Corcoran decision, however, preceded the Supreme
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake. This is
troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check on the
thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization
review system. With liability rules generally inapplicable, there is theoretically
less deterrence of substandard medical decisionmaking. Moreover, if the cost of
compliance with a standard of care (reflected either in the cost of prevention or
the cost of paying judgments) need not be factored into utilization review
companies' cost of doing business, bad medical judgments will end up being cost-
free to the plans that rely on these companies to contain medical costs. ERISA
plans, in turn, will have one less incentive to seek out the companies that can
deliver both high quality services and reasonable prices.
Id. Other courts have also refused to limit the scope of ERISA preemption even though
recharacterization of the claim as a denial of benefits under an employee benefit plan left
plaintiffs without a meaningful remedy. See, e.g., Turner v. Fallon Community Health
Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419,424 (D. Mass. 1997).
243. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331-33.
244. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Cannon v. Group
Health, 77 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (10th Cir.) (holding that ERISA preempted claim for
damages for death of patient caused by delayed preauthorization of an autologous bone
marrow transplant), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 66 (1996); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of
Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted a
medical malpractice claim against an HMO for delaying payment approval for decedent's
heart transplant because the suit was based on an allegedly improper processing of a
medical benefits claim). In Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th
Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit ruled that a negligence claim against an employee of an
URO for determining that inpatient physical therapy was not medically necessary should
be recharacterized as an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claim to recover benefits due under an
employee benefit plan. See id. at 1489. ERISA, therefore, did not preempt the claim.
However, the court dismissed the suit against the employee because ERISA allows claims
to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity. See id. at 1490; see also Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA preempts
claim against UROs for refusal to authorize psychiatric benefits because it "relates to"
the benefits plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that ERISA preempts state common law wrongful death actions); Clark v. Humana
Kansas City, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that claim against
URO for negligent provision of psychiatric screening was preempted by ERISA, although
plaintiff was allowed to amend complaint to add a claim against URO for breach of
fiduciary duty); Turner, 953 F. Supp. at 425 (holding wrongful death claim against URO
preempted); Kohn v. Delaware Valley HMO, CIV.A.91-2745, 1992 WL 22241, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1992) (reasoning that utilization review decisions are benefits
determinations); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F.
Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding claim against HMO for refusal to pay for
certain procedures preempted because claim has a "connection with or reference to a
benefit plan"). But see Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 715-16, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct.)
(holding that ERISA does not preempt a negligence claim against an MCO for delay in
approval of patient transfer to another facility that resulted from a cost-containment
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Court's ruling in Travelers. In dicta, the Travelers Court suggested
that ERISA might not preempt medical malpractice claims against
UROs based on either direct or vicarious liability.245 The Supreme
Court found that "nothing in the language of the Act or the context
of its passage indicates that Congress chose to displace general health
care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
concern," such as quality standards.246 Consequently, the courts still
protocol), appeal granted, 686 A.2d 1312 (Pa. 1996).
245. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659-62 (1995); Sylvia L. Wenger, Comment, New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, et al. v. Travelers Insurance Company, et
al.: Medical Malpractice and Enabling Regulation in States Again, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv.
131, 146 (1996). In the context of HMO liability, HMOs have successfully employed
ERISA preemption as a defense against medical malpractice claims based on direct
negligence. See Shah, supra note 120, at 1560-61; see also Jass, 88 F.3d at 1493-94
(holding that vicarious liability claim against HMO administrator of employee benefit
plan for the medical malpractice of the treating physician preempted because the alleged
negligence by the physician for failure to treat stemmed from the HMO's denial of
benefits, and, therefore, "relates to" the plan); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 318
(D.N.J. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempts state tort claims arising under the theory of
vicarious liability).
HMOs, however, have achieved limited success with indirect claims, such as
ostensible agency. See, e.g., PacifiCare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that ERISA does not preempt a medical malpractice claim based on
vicarious liability against an HMO); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3rd
Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA does not result in complete preemption of an ostensible
agency malpractice suit because such a claim attacks the quality of the benefits provided
rather than alleging an improper denial of benefits and that quality control of benefits "is
a field traditionally occupied by state regulation and we interpret the silence of Congress
as reflecting an intent that it remain such"); Hoyt v. Edge, CIV.A.97-3631, 1997 WL
356324, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 1997) (relying on Dukes and holding that ERISA does
not preempt claims against HMO's physicians for medical malpractice and against HMO
for failure to refer plaintiff to a competent physician for a second opinion because these
allegations attack the quality of the benefits provided); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that
ERISA does not preempt state law medical malpractice claims or vicarious liability
claims); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
that preemption does not extend to claims of vicarious liability for medical malpractice);
Pickett v. Cigna Healthplan, 742 F. Supp. 946, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that common
law medical malpractice case does not raise questions regarding claims administration);
Independence HMO v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that state
tort claim based on theory of ostensible agency does not "relate to" an ERISA plan).
246. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995). In Corporate Health Insurance Inc. v. Texas Department of
Insurance, 12 F.Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 1998), the court held that ERISA does
not preempt the provisions of the Health Care Liability Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West 1998), that require a managed care entity to exercise
ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions and permit individuals injured
as a result of a failure to conform to this duty of care, to bring suit. See id. at 602, 620.
The court reasoned that ERISA does not preempt claims of improper care, because such
claims challenge the quality of care received, but ERISA does preempt claims of failure
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grapple with whether or not ERISA protects UR decisionmakers
from liability for negligent determinations in the context of employee
benefit plans. The next Part analyzes potential alternatives to rectify
this controversy.
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF ERISA
The time has come to amend ERISA.247 ERISA's preemption
provisions combined with the limited remedies available under
ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty have shielded UROs, as well as
third-party payers, from the consequences of UR decisions. Several
options exist to resolve this inadequacy:24 (1) place those who make
UR decisions under ERISA's fiduciary obligations; (2) remove
ERISA's preemption provisions as they relate to UR decisions; or (3)
impose new obligations on UR decisionmakers under ERISA.
A. Fiduciary Duty
The imposition of a fiduciary duty is appropriate when there is
no or only minimal conflict of interest between the fiduciary and the
party to whom the duty is owed.249 As discussed in Part IV, a
significant conflict of interest exists between UROs and plan
participants.150 UROs seek to lower costs through the denial of care,
whereas participants try to obtain care. Furthermore, the use of
ERISA's fiduciary duty requirement in the absence of effective
remedies creates an unrealistic mandate without teeth.2' Therefore,
the legislature should not extend ERISA's fiduciary duty to include
UROs. s
to cover a particular treatment, these claims are benefit determinations. See id. at 619-20.
247. This view is shared by the National Governors' Association which, in 1994, at its
annual conference in Washington, D.C., made ERISA reform a priority. See Jesselyn
Alicia Brown, Note, ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Roadblock or Scapegoat?, 13
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 339,342 (1995).
248. These options apply only to an ex post scenario wherein a participant who is
harmed as the result of a negligent UR decision seeks compensation for the injury. In
contrast, in an ex ante situation, the URO has denied payment for a participant's medical
care but the participant has not been injured and cannot, therefore, recover in tort. The
participant seeks to appeal the UR decision in an effort to obtain approval for payment of
medical care yet to be provided.
249. Cf. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 162, at 1114 ("The duty of loyalty is
prophylactic; its purpose [is] to deter the trustee from engaging in self-interested conduct
at the expense of the beneficiaries.").
250. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
252. Instead, the application of the fiduciary duty standard under ERISA should be
limited to employers and should be imposed only under the following circumstances: (1)




Congress enacted ERISA "to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans''2s3 and
"to protect contractually defined benefits." 4  An interpretation of
ERISA's preemption provisions that situates plan participants in a
position worse than that under pre-ERISA state law runs counter to
congressional intent.255  However, even if amending ERISA
preemption provisions to permit state common law actions against
UROs and third-party payers would respect ERISA's policy of
preserving state regulation of insurance, 6 allowing such actions
such as an MCO, or by the employer; (2) the decision to change the plan(s) offered; (3)
the decision to terminate a plan; (4) the determination that the plan does not cover a
particular treatment, diagnostic test, etc. for a specific disease or disorder but not a
determination that the plan does not cover a particular treatment, etc. for a specific
participant; (5) disclosure and adequate representation of all information that would be
material to the average participant when making a decision whether to subscribe to or
continue to subscribe to the plan; and (6) denial of benefits claims. Fiduciary duty should
be limited to these actions because each regards either the plan as a whole or the
employees as a whole-situations where the employer's interests are in the least conflict
with the employees' interests. Such a formulation is consistent with ERISA's conception
of fiduciary duty. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994); supra note 151 (quoting the statute). By
imposing these obligations on employers as fiduciary duties, Congress would force
employers, the parties in the best position to know of and to dispense the resources of the
business and who retain authority to determine the scope and availability of plan benefits,
to consider the best interests of their employees when making plan decisions and when
negotiating with their employees regarding plan benefits. However, narrowing the field
of fiduciary duty will prove insufficient if remedies for breach of fiduciary duty are not
expanded to correspond to the injuries suffered.
Arguably, decisions by employers to terminate a plan or change plan terms should be
left to the market. The threat of employee discontent may provide employers with an
incentive not to terminate a plan without suitable justification. Not all employers,
however, will take their employees' interests into consideration, and not all employees
possess sufficient power to bargain with their employer over health benefits. Imposing a
fiduciary duty on employers only in the scenarios listed above will protect employees
from employers who will alter health benefits without any consideration of the interests of
the employees as a whole. Because the fiduciary duty extends to the plan as a whole or to
employees as a whole, however, an employer's decision to change the terms of a plan or
to terminate a plan because it is no longer feasible for the business to incur those costs
would be consistent with the employer's fiduciary duty.
253. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
254. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985).
255. The Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989),
rejected the use of a standard of review that "would afford less protection to employees
and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted." Id. at 114.
256. Arguably, utilization review is not the business of insurance, as defined under
section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 24, § 2(b), 59 Stat. 34, 34 (1945), as
amended ch. 326, 61 Stat. 448, 448 (1947) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b) (1994)). The
United States Department of Labor has filed amicus briefs in support of narrowing
ERISA's preemption to allow participants to sue ERISA plans for physician malpractice.
See Scheutzow, supra note 112, at 196.
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threatens to impose unnecessary costs and runs counter to ERISA's
purpose of protecting employee benefit plans from a patchwork of
state regulation. Furthermore, because of the wide disparity in
permissible tort actions between states, the redress available to
injured participants will vary depending upon the state in which the
participant is injured5 7  Although the protection of employee
interests arguably supersedes the protection of employer interests, a
solution that satisfies both goals would best serve the congressional
intent behind ERISA as well as the interests of the parties for whom
ERISA was enacted. Moreover, an increase in employer costs risks a
shift in costs to employees. Therefore, measures that hinder
employer interests in uniformity also threaten to interfere with
employee interests.
The imposition of common law tort liability on UROs may carry
certain disadvantages. Permitting UROs to define their standard of
care, as physicians currently do, risks setting a low floor for URO
negligence 5 8 Furthermore, if the patient wins in court, she may not
receive compensation for several years.29 A tort regime may offer its
greatest advantage, however, by creating an effective deterrent rather
than providing adequate compensation. In particular, the risk of tort
257. It remains possible that a participant injured in one state as the result of a
negligent UR decision would receive compensation, yet a participant injured by the same
decision but living in a neighboring state would receive no compensation. The result
unnecessarily threatens ERISA plan UROs with complying with as many as 50 different
standards of care while leaving the extent of participant recovery to the variability of
state tort systems.
258. As Judge Learned Hand stated in The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932):
"Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages." Id. at
740. The standard of care applied under a negligence regime is the reasonable person
standard: what the reasonable person would do under like circumstances. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 173-75 (5th ed. 1984). In
contrast, the medical malpractice standard is a custom-based standard: what a doctor
with the skill, knowledge, and care commonly possessed by members of the profession in
good standing would do. See id. § 32, at 185-87.
259. If UROs are allowed to determine their standard of care, the outcome of
negligence cases may depend on who obtains the better expert. Injured patients may
decide not to file negligence claims because of the difficulty of proving negligence. It has
been argued that such an effect is seen with medical malpractice claims. See Randall,
supra note 57, at 18. In addition, as in the case of medical malpractice, compensation may
be inequitable with a few plaintiffs receiving excessive awards while the majority of
injured parties receive none. Yet, short of a no-fault system, any tort regime imposed for
negligent UR decisions will require expert testimony and risk insufficient compensation.
A no-fault system for compensation risks abuse by inappropriate parties and does not
provide a deterrent effect, which, arguably, is more important than the compensatory
function. See infra text accompanying notes 276-79.
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liability may prove sufficient to improve quality of care while limiting
the number and severity of patient injuries, thereby also diminishing
the need for compensation. Moreover, placing liability for particular
actions on the shoulders of those parties responsible for the actions
would discourage third-party payers and UROs from demanding too
great a role in treatment decisions while also acting as a deterrent
against underutilization of care.26 Therefore, the optimal solution
260. Alternatively, liability for all decisions and actions, including medical malpractice,
could be imposed solely on the payers since they, at least some of the larger ones,
maintain deep pockets. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical
Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REv. 381
(1994) (advocating imposing enterprise liability on hospitals); William M. Sage et al.,
Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20
AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994); William M. Sage & James M. Jorling, A World that Won't
Stand Still: Enterprise Liability by Private Contract, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1007 (1994). But
see Sharon M. Glenn, Tort Liability of Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems: Beyond
Enterprise Liability, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 305 (1994) (arguing that, in the absence of
enterprise liability, health care organizations will nonetheless be subject to common law
tort principles of medical liability). However, "enterprise liability" holds disadvantages,
particularly when applied to ERISA. By holding only payers responsible, enterprise
liability shields those involved in the provision of care, physicians and other providers,
from liability. Although payers could monitor physician behavior, the resources involved
to both monitor and cover the costs of increased liability may exceed the capacity of many
employers who offer employee benefit plans, forcing current sponsors to abandon their
plans and deterring potential sponsors from establishing plans. As a result, enterprise
liability could work to undermine ERISA's objectives.
While shifting liability onto UROs and third-party payers is one key reform,
additional reforms are necessary to sufficiently protect employee interests. Liability only
furnishes retrospective damages. To receive adequate benefits, plan participants require
sufficient information pertaining to the financial incentives that affect physician
decisionmaking so that they can make informed choices. ERISA may require plan
fiduciaries to disclose those financial arrangements that may adversely affect a physician's
medical judgments. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362,372-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that failure by an HMO, as an ERISA fiduciary, to disclose its incentive scheme to plan
participants is a breach of fiduciary duty if, as a result of these incentives, physicians
withhold or delay providing necessary medical care); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-
29 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an HMO, under ERISA's fiduciary obligations, has a duty
to notify plan participants of financial incentives it offers that discourage physicians from
providing necessary referrals to specialists for illnesses covered by the plan). But see
Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
ERISA does not impose on plan fiduciaries a duty to disclose physician compensation
agreements).
Participants also need adequate grievance and appeal procedures to contest adverse
benefits determinations and to receive quick redress when appropriate. See Scheutzow,
supra note 112, at 216. ERISA's mandate that each participant receive a reasonable
opportunity for review of a benefits denial and the judiciary's interpretation that
exhaustion of remedies is applicable together prove insufficient to meet this challenge
because they delay resolution of a patient's grievance and unduly limit access to the
judicial system. See id. at 218; see also Kinney, supra note 47 (discussing ways to improve
grievance procedures and arguing for the need to implement strategies to avoid
grievances); Stayn, supra note 55, at 1676, 1701-06 (describing the absence of a uniform
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would be to impose liability on UROs and third-party payers under
federal law for negligent utilization review decisions without
narrowing ERISA's preemption to such an extent as to expose UROs
and third-party payers to liability under state law. 61
C. Recommendations
Congress should amend ERISA to add incentives that advance
health policy objectives while promoting the goals of ERISA by: (1)
imposing a duty of care on those who make UR decisions;262 (2)
creating a federal cause of action for a negligent UR decision and
negligent design of UR guidelines; (3) establishing incentives to deter
UR decisionmaking that would adversely impact participants' health;
and (4) furnishing appropriate remedies to injured participants by
providing adequate redress. Fashioning such a duty would offer
uniformity of requirements and predictability of legal obligations.
Consistent with ERISA's goal of uniform regulation, claims for a
negligent UR decision or negligent UR design should be adjudicated
under federal law. ERISA's legislative history indicates that "a body
of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal
with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and
pension plans. 26 3 The Supreme Court has recognized Congress's
intent that federal courts establish federal substantive law under
ERISA.2 4 Therefore, two avenues exist by which to bring claims,
one through the federal district courts and one through the state
courts as long as the right to appeal lies only to the federal court of
recourse system across HMOs to protect patients from undertreatment). Current HMO
procedural protections, such as the voluntary National Committee for Quality Assurance
standards and state and Medicare HMO regulations, are also of limited utility for
employee protection. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in
Capitated Health Plans, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 301,307-10, 314-18 (1996).
261. In light of the Supreme Court's dicta in Travelers, and its willingness in
Dillingham to try to return to a more traditional preemption doctrine, there is the
possibility that the judiciary independently will continue to chip away at ERISA's
preemption provisions until UROs are exposed to state common law tort claims.
Imposing uniform liability on UR decisionmakers through an amendment to ERISA
would prevent the courts from exposing ERISA plans to a patchwork of state tort regimes
and eroding preemption protections beyond those proposed in this Article.
262. Third-party payers who do not make UR decisions do not incur direct liability for
such determinations, though a URO and a payer could agree that the payer would
indemnify the URO if the URO is sued. Such arrangements are left, however, to the
market.
263. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Senator Javits, one of the bill's
sponsors).





Creating original jurisdiction in state courts for negligent
decision claims offers several advantages over federal district courts,
including judicial economy, judicial efficiency, and expertise. Federal
dockets remain backlogged and overcrowded 265 in comparison to
state courts. In addition, claims for a negligent UR decision are
generally tied to allegations of medical malpractice, a cause of action
that state courts typically address and for which they have developed
broad expertise. Such medical malpractice claims may require
presentation of the same evidence as that used for the claim of a
negligent UR decision or negligent design of UR guidelines.
Allowing certain claims to proceed in state court and other claims to
proceed in federal court would increase judicial inefficiency and raise
the litigation costs of both employees and UROs; therefore,
negligence claims under ERISA should be brought under a single
judicial system. For these reasons and because state courts
collectively control more extensive judicial resources than federal
district courts, claims under ERISA against UROs and third-party
payers regarding utilization review decisions and the design of
utilization review guidelines should be permitted only in state court.
To create a body of federal common law consistent with
congressional intent, however, and to provide greater uniformity of
court-imposed obligations on UROs and third-party payers, plaintiffs
should be granted a right of appeal only to the federal courts of
appeal.266
1. Legislative Proposal
Congress should create a duty of care under ERISA for those
entities that make utilization review decisions affecting plan
participants or beneficiaries by including the following provision:
All utilization review decisions and utilization review
guidelines shall meet the medical standard of care, as
defined by the practice of the ordinary, competent physician
under like circumstances, unless the entity making the
utilization review decision or designing the utilization
265. See Hearing on Federal Jurisdiction over Class Action Suits Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong. (1998), available in 1998 WL
375020 (testimony of Richaxd H. Middleton, Jr., Vice President of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America) (discussing federal court backlog and noting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist recently stated in his speech to the American Law Institute that federal courts
are overburdened).
266. Such a system would also Prohibit forum shopping, thereby reducing the drain on
the resources of both the judiciary and the litigating parties.
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review guidelines demonstrates by reasonable scientific
evidence that its decision or guidelines provide a participant
or beneficiary with a level of care of reasonably similar
efficacy and safety as the medical standard of care. The
imposed duty of care is nondelegable267 and applies to any
entity that makes a utilization review decision or designs a
utilization review guideline.2 s Participants or beneficiaries
may bring a cause of action for a negligent utilization review
decision269 or negligent design of a utilization review
guideline in state court against any entity that makes a
utilization review decision or designs a utilization review
guideline.27 To succeed on the merits, the participant or
beneficiary must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the entity's decision or guideline did not conform to the
medical standard of care as established by expert testimony
and that the decision or guideline was a proximate cause of
the injury. If the participant or beneficiary meets his or her
burden of proof, the burden shifts271 to the entity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence, based on reasonable
scientific evidence, as established by expert testimony and
the records of the entity, that the decision approves or the
design provides medical care of reasonably similar efficacy
and safety as the medical standard of care and, in the case of
a negligent decision claim, that the entity complied with its
guidelines. A participant or beneficiary who succeeds on
the merits may receive attorneys' fees, compensatory and
267. The duty should be nondelegable to prevent UROs or third-party payers from
contracting out of their obligations.
268. In a definitions section of the proposed legislation, "entity" should be defined so
as to preclude the liability of an individual for injury caused by a utilization review
decision made as an agent of an entity, if the decision is consistent with the entity's UR
guidelines.
269. A negligent utilization review decision includes a delay in decisionmaking that
causes injury to the participant or beneficiary as the result of the delay. Alternatively,
Congress could establish set time periods in which different categories of utilization
review decisions must be made thereby providing greater predictability for a URO of its
legal obligations.
270. This provision addresses the situation in which a utilization review decision
caused harm to a participant or beneficiary under an ERISA plan (ex post scenario). A
separate scenario exists when a participant or beneficiary disagrees with a utilization
review decision and seeks approval for care denied because the URO determined that
such care was not medically appropriate or medically necessary (ex ante scenario). In this
circumstance, an alternative appeals process through the URO, an independent state
review board, or another entity should be implemented rather than using the court system
as the first line of appeal.
271. See infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale for
permitting an entity an opportunity to escape liability even though a plaintiff has
demonstrated that the UR decision did not meet the medical standard of care.
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punitive damages. 72 State court decisions may be appealed
to the federal court of appeals for the district in which the
state court resides. A treating physician who disagrees with
a utilization review decision remains liable for medical
malpractice for his or her own decisions but will not incur
additional responsibility for the utilization review decision if
he or she appeals the utilization review decision to the
entity on a one-time basis and explains to the participant or
beneficiary the course of care that he or she recommends
and why he or she disagrees with the utilization review
decision.273
2. Rationale
In adopting the proposed standard of care, Congress would
promote the policy objective of providing quality, cost-efficient
health care. Because utilization review decisions are akin to and
often have the effect of medical decisions, UR decisionmakers should
be expected to maintain a standard of care similar to the medical
standard of care-that is, the standard of practice of the ordinary,
competent physician in like circumstances.274 By using this medical
standard, plan participants could expect a minimum level of quality
in UR guidelines and in UR decisions. 5 The UR industry should,
however, be permitted to design a different standard if it maintains
similar levels of quality and supports its alternative standard of care
with scientific evidence. Therefore, Congress should require that all
UR decisions and UR guidelines meet the medical standard of care
unless the entity making the UR decision or designing the UR
guidelines demonstrates by reasonable scientific evidence that its
272. Because imposing liability may place some self-insured plans at risk for
insolvency, a cap on punitive damages is recommended, possibly as a multiple of the
compensatory damages awarded.
273. Some commentators would allow physicians a cost-based defense. Under a cost-
based defense, a physician could present evidence that, although she breached the
standard of care, the breach was not the result of negligence but was an appropriate
response to incentives to contain cost. See, e.g., John J. Howard, Medical Malpractice
Liability and Cost Containment: Law and Economics in Conflict, 43 FooD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 309, 329 (1988). However, offering such a defense for physician conduct reintroduces
the economic conflict of interest between physicians and patients that this proposal seeks
to remove.
274. See, e.g., Smith v. Menet, 530 N.E.2d 277, 279-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). The most
common standard of medical practice is a national standard. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff,
235 N.E.2d 793,798 (Mass. 1968).
275. Although the medical standard of care describes the level of quality we expect of
the medical community, it remains a low hurdle to clear as the result of its emphasis on
the practice of the average rather than the best physician. See Menet, 530 N.E.2d at 279.
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decision or guidelines provide a participant with a level of care of
reasonably similar efficacy and safety as the medical standard of care.
This standard provides a measure of protection for participants,
consistent with ERISA's mandate, while also providing a shield
against liability for entities that make UR decisions. Although
imposing the risk of liability may indirectly raise the costs of an
ERISA plan, the proposed standard affords an opportunity to avoid
such liability.
The proposal ,offers several additional benefits. The threat of
tort liability would provide UROs with an incentive to invest in
effective ex ante procedures, appropriate UR guidelines, and
competent UR reviewers. Greater accountability and increased
transparency of negligent UR processing through documentation in
court records-and the subsequent risk of negative publicity-will
encourage UROs to make more responsible decisions up front to
avoid risking injury to participants. If appropriate decisions are
made ex ante, the issue of compensation becomes less relevant. At
the same time, UROs and third-party payers would receive an
inducement to *align with the medical community rather than create
further conflict.276
A standard of care that permits the UR industry to avoid
liability by justifying its actions through scientific evidence offers an
economic incentive to the industry and third-party payers to invest in
medical research on the diagnosis, treatment, and management of
diseases to ascertain alternative, lower-cost means of care.2 17 This, in
turn, would create new sources of funding for medical research and
provide UROs and third-party payers with an opportunity to both
lower the costs of ERISA plans and adequately protect themselves
from inappropriate and indiscriminate liability. The medical
profession would also retain its authority to determine the medical
standard of care without the outside threat currently posed by UROs.
At the same time the medical community would have greater
incentives to pursue outcomes research27 in an effort to justify
276. This proposal removes the need to use financial incentives to encourage
physicians to alter their clinical practice since UROs or third-party payers may determine
the appropriateness of medical care with relative assurance that their decision will survive
scrutiny if adequately supported by scientific data.
277. Both the public and the medical community have assumed that the medical
standard of care offers optimal patient care. However, the practices of different
physicians for the same illness may vary widely and there may not be adequate scientific
evidence supporting the use of certain diagnostic tests, treatments, and forms of
management, either alone, or in conjunction with each other. See infra notes 279, 282.




The presence of medical uncertainty2s0 and the absence of
scientific justification for many current medical practices28l remain
important sources of rising costs in the health care system, and,
consequently, in ERISA plans as well.m The imposition of a duty of
care and the proposed standard of care create an opportunity for the
private sector's business and medical communities to align to correct
this information failure. As a result, the medical standard of care
itself may improve through the proposal's incentive to study fully the
justifications and rationales underlying current practice, thereby
furthering the goal of providing quality health care more effectively
and at lower costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evolution of UROs in response to the escalating costs of
domestic health care has affected the provision of health care in the
United States. As a consequence of ERISA's preemption provisions,
however, UROs have avoided liability for injuries incurred by
ERISA plan participants due to negligent utilization review
decision-making. This article has recommended that any reform of
ERISA should be undertaken with the intent to promote the
systems and practices in an effort to identify which practices best promote positive patient
outcomes. See David N. Sundwall, Foreward to CLINICAL PATHS: TOOLS FOR
OUTCOMES MANAGEMENT at xix (Patricia L. Spath ed., 1994).
279. Practice guidelines promulgated by the medical community may lead to increased
uniformity of practice but will not lower costs unless physicians receive an incentive to
connect value to costs when researching and designing their own guidelines. See Louis P.
Garrison, Jr., Assessment of the Effectiveness of Supply-Side and Cost-Containment
Measures, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., 1991 Annual Supp., at 13, 16-17. This
Article's proposal seeks to furnish that incentive.
280. See Eric E. Fortess & Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing,
and Legal Liability, 13 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 213, 213 (1985). Medical
uncertainty refers to "those clinical situations, in which, based on available data, absolute
scientific proof regarding some aspects of a patient's health status cannot be obtained."
See id
281. See, e.g., Henry E. Simmons, The Nation's Least Understood Healthcare
Problem-The Quality of Medical Care (Where is Healthcare Headed?), 20
GENERATIONS 57,58 (1996).
282. Medical uncertainty may lead to overly conservative treatment decisions as well
as overtreatment. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The
Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 (1986). Between 20% to
30% of physician actions, although well-intentioned, may be inappropriate and
unnecessary. Such actions stem from medical uncertainties. See Leonard Abramson,
Better Quality Through Accountability, Bus. & HEALTH, Nov. 11, 1990, at 64, 64.
Therefore, this Article's proposal serves to correct a market failure that has resulted from
inadequate information to providers, patients, and payers.
1999]
782 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77
domestic policy goal of quality, economically efficient health care.
By looking at the preemption issue in the larger context of health
care policy, modifications of ERISA's framework could be enacted
for the universal benefit through improved and cost-efficient health
care rather than limited to the redress of injured plan participants.
